Growing popular concern about immigration could see the centre-right benefit in Sunday’s election
by Fabio Bordignon, Luigi Ceccarini and Ilvo Diamanti**
The politics of fear is once again affecting the Italian elections. After debates about fake news
and the promise of very expensive, and for this reason unachievable,
policies, shaped the first stage of the electoral campaign, the
immigration issue has been at the heart of public discussion over these
last few weeks (even though unemployment ranks as the highest issue of
concern for voters).
It’s not the first time: other general elections in the recent past
have been strongly characterised by the insecurity produced by
immigration flows and the actions of the political entrepreneurs of fear:
political actors who try to capitalise on xenophobic feelings to extend
their support. But, in the case of the 2018 campaign, it’s more
difficult to forecast the effects of these issues on the final result.
Opinion polls have already showed some clues about this. But, a clearer
frame will be sketched out by analysing the election outcome and
performing post-electoral surveys.
The connection between immigration and security has been quite strong
in the perceptions of Italian public opinion since the mid-nineties. A
significant portion of Italians think that the presence of migrants
poses a threat to public order and people’s safety. This perception is
reinforced by official data which say that the proportion of immigrants –
especially, illegal immigrants – amongst offenders is particularly high
for specific crimes. According to data collected by Demos & Pi at
the beginning of 2018, fear of ‘strangers’ is widespread in Italian
society: 45% of interviewed people see immigrants as a threat to their
security. If we analyse the complete time series, this index has reached
comparable levels only two times before: between 1999 and 2001, and
once again between 2007 and 2008. Both phases coincided with the run-up
to a general election. Both campaigns were won by a centre-right
coalition.
This issue has become, once again, a hot issue during the 2018
campaign as well. After reaching its highest peak at the end of 2007 –
when one Italian out of two viewed people coming from other countries
with suspicion – social apprehension about immigration had constantly
declined until 2012. But it has reassumed an upward trend over the last
five years, especially since 2016 (see Figure 1). The outbreak of the
migrant and refugee crisis in 2015 saw the issue assume a central stage
in public debate, especially regarding uncontrolled sea arrivals from
Africa to Italian shores through the Mediterranean.
Figure 1: Percentage of Italians who view migrants as a threat for public order and Italians’ safety
Source: Demos&Pi Opinion Polls (1999-2018)
In the summer of 2017, there were clashes in the streets of Rome
between the police and groups of refugees and asylum seekers protesting
for having been removed from a building they had been squatting.
Combined with other episodes of violence of which immigrants were the
protagonists (or victims), and with fears connected with possible
terrorist attacks, this event significantly increased the tensions
around the theme of immigration, and further fuelled xenophobic and even
racist sentiments.
In 2018 centre-right parties have once again promptly assumed their
role as entrepreneurs of fear. This holds in particular for Matteo
Salvini’s League, which openly reinforced its anti-immigration stance
during the campaign, saying we need to stop an ‘invasion’ and put
‘Italians first’. Once a regionalist party, the League has been
transformed by its new leader into a national(ist) euro-sceptic party,
which takes the French Front National as a model. Among its voters, 69%
see foreign people as a danger. The figure is equally high for their
other centre-right allies: around 65-66% for both Silvio Berlusconi’s
Forza Italia and Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy.
In addition, many far-right movements and parties, outside the
official centre-right, are very active in Italy and have increased their
activism (and public visibility) in the recent phase. The tension
reached its highest peak in early February, only one month before the
general elections, when a young man went on a drive-by shooting
targeting black people in the small and historically rich town of
Macerata, seat of an old university. A few days before, near the same
city, a Nigerian immigrant was accused of having murdered a young girl
whose body was found dismembered in two suitcases. What impresses about
the events is that they happened in central Italy – in the Marche region
– traditionally known as a peaceful and socially integrated area. The
Macerata gunman, who had been candidate for the League in local
elections, was arrested by the police wearing an Italian flag on his
shoulders, making a fascist salute and saying ‘I’ve done what had to be
done’. 11% of Italians, interviewed by Demos & Pi, said the man had
done ‘what many would like to do’.
In the centre-right coalition, Silvio Berlusconi is trying to present
himself as a moderate barrier against the many different versions of
Italian populism. But after the Macerata events, the old leader has
called for the expulsion of 600,000 illegal immigrants, describing
immigration as a ‘social time bomb’. This statement can be interpreted
as a defensive move against the internal challenge represented by
Salvini, who claim the League will be the leading centre-right party,
and he will be the next prime minister. The new electoral system has
favoured the re-unification of a strongly divided centre-right and given
Berlusconi the opportunity to ‘enter’ the field again after years in
the background. Those parties have been able to build a coalition, which
led the last polls published before the electoral blackout, at around
35-37%. It might not be enough to avoid a hung parliament scenario, but,
if they are going to win, it will be crucial to check the actual
balance inside the coalition to understand where the new majority would
stand on an ideal moderate-radical political spectrum with regards to
immigration as well as other policy issues.
It’s not easy to assess how this social climate will impact on the
results on 4th March and to understand if the security syndrome is going
to play the same role as in 2008. Since then the configuration of the
main political blocs has somewhat changed. In particular, the governing
centre-left seems to have changed – or, at least, redefined – its
traditional pro-immigration outlook, which used to promote solidarity
and integration and was always ready to deny the immigration-criminality
equation. Its Interior Minister, Marco Minniti, has gained popularity
in recent months through his measures to reduce arrivals of African
migrants through the Mediterranean. While the Democratic party leader,
Matteo Renzi, has even tried to ‘steal’ some of Salvini’s slogans,
saying that immigrants should be helped ‘at home’ (i.e. in their
countries).
Moreover, Italian politics, since 2013, has assumed a tri-polar
format. And the Italian ‘third pole’, represented by the Five Star
Movement, has always expressed a very ambiguous attitude on the
immigration issue. Some of its leaders have not hesitated to express
hard words on the theme of migration, using arguments and tones very
similar to those used by the right. Even though these positions has
often been ‘balanced’ with opposite views expressed by other Five Star
representatives who stressed the exploitation of Africa territory and
society by multinational companies. In accordance with this ambiguous
stance, its supporters appear to be almost equally divided as regards
its attitudes on the migration issue. During the 2018 campaign, Roberta
Lombardi, the Movement’s candidate for the Regional elections in Lazio,
declared her territory should ‘welcome more tourism, which helps local
economy, and less immigrants, who weigh on the local economy’. ‘It’s not
a question of left and right, but a question of common sense’, she
added.
The Italian 2018 general election will help (among other things) to
check whether, in a (supposedly) post-ideological era, the immigration
issue still has definite political colour.
** This article was originally posted on the SPERI website
as part of an IPSG blog series on the 2018 general election. Over the
coming week more blogs will be posted which will be available to read here.
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