Dear supporters of the petition to reinstate Professor Jim Newell in his job at the University of Salford, this petition is now closed and I would like to thank you, yet again,
for your tremendous support. Following is a message to all of you from
Jim Newell.
Daniele Albertazzi
"Dear all
Though I have decided to cease seeking reinstatement with Salford, I
remain fully committed to campaigning against the marketisation of
Higher Education. When I joined academia in 1991, UK universities were
self-respecting institutions dedicated to teaching and research for
their own sakes; essentially decent employers; institutions which, yes,
were hierarchical as all institutions inevitably are, but which were
also run on the collegial lines befitting the academic calling. All that
has since largely gone as universities have come to be viewed as
businesses, often run by managers with no background in academia –
institutions governed with an eye almost exclusively on league tables,
institutions in which teaching and research appear to be valued only and
exclusively to the extent that they make money.
I know that I am by no means alone in refusing to accept that this is
a legitimate way to run universities and I look forward to contributing
to the growing tide of resistance to it among academic staff and
students.
Many thanks for all your tremendous support.
Jim Newell"
The next PSA Conference will take place in Nottingham on
15-17 April 2019. The PSA Italian Politics Specialist Group will run at least
three conference panels. Please find below our calls for papers.
Panel 1. Populist Parties in Government: Suffering, Surviving or
Thriving?
What happens to populist parties once they get into power?
This is not a trivial question. Literature has addressed this subject in the
past. For instance, the volume by Albertazzi and McDonnell (2015) is an
important contribution in the field. Their research shows that populist parties
can survive when in government. In fact, they can even thrive, consolidating or
further expanding their success. However, other scholars (i.e. Heinisch, 2010)
underlined that, once in government, populist parties are forced to confront
the harsh reality. The expectations they raised may turn out to be a
double-edged sword. One may therefore argue that populist parties, because of
the nature of their claims and their communication style, tend to be more politically
and electorally successful when in opposition. After the recent general elections in Italy, two populist
parties, the League and the 5 Start Movement, formed a coalition government. Of
course, this is not the first populist government in Italy. Berlusconi’s party
and the Northern League ruled together in the 1990s and 2000s. Yet until the
late 2000s, governmental populism was mainly regarded as an anomaly, a
temporary deviation from political normality. Over the last years, however,
right-wing and left-wing populist parties have entered (or backed) governments
in an increasing number of European countries. This panel aims to contribute to
the renewed debate on populist parties and their relationship with power and
governmental responsibility. We encourage submission of papers that tackle this topic
from different perspectives, such as: policy agendas, institutional and
political communication, party organisation and leadership, intra-coalition
conflicts etc.
Panel 2. The Red Sunset: Challenges to Social Democracy in an Age
of Political Turmoil
In recent years a great amount of research has focused on
the rise of new political actors in a context of increasing uncertainty.
Considerably less attention has been paid to how mainstream centre-left parties
across Europe (and beyond) have reacted (and adapted) to changing political and
socio-economic circumstances. Whereas the 1980s and 1990s were seen as a phase
of transition, transformation and renewal of social democracy, the current
decade has been marked by the dramatic – perhaps irreversible – decline in the
fortunes of one of the oldest and most resilient political families in the
European democratic tradition. The aim of this panel is to shed light not only
on the circumstances that have contributed to the crisis of social-democratic
parties over the last ten years but also on the impact that such crisis has on
democratic processes and public policy. We identify three key areas that can be
analysed by contributors. The first area focuses on internal characteristics of
social democratic parties, that is, their organisation/membership, leadership
and their political programmes. The second one looks at the social and
political environment in which social democratic parties compete. One may
consider transformations in socio-economic conditions and voters’ attitudes and
preferences (demand-side) or changing patterns of inter-party competition, with
the emerge of new challengers (supply-side). Lastly the third area focuses on
the implications of the social democratic crisis for Western European
democracies and for relevant policy areas. Of course, the three areas
identified here should not necessarily be analysed in isolation and we also
welcome contributions that aim to establish links between them.
Panel 3. New Dynamics of National and Transnational Party
Competition in Europe (Joint Call for Papers of the French Politics, German
Politics, Greek Politics, Italian Politics, Nordic Politics, and Parliaments
Specialist Groups)
The year 2019 will be crucial for the European Union, since
radically new political equilibria could emerge in the aftermath of the
elections to the European Parliament in May. Anti-establishment and populist
parties are expected to win significant support, and this may have important
consequences for the governance of the single market and the processes of
political and economic integration. The joint panels will explore how the competition between
political parties in Europe is shaping dynamics at both national and
supranational levels in the year of the European Parliament elections. Are we
observing a redefinition of political cleavages? Are European political parties
forming new transnational alliances and coalitions? Can we identify diverging
political trends in different parts of Europe (Central Eastern vs Western
Europe or Northern vs Southern Europe)? What are the consequences of these
changing dynamics for the effective functioning of the European Parliament, and
indeed the European Union? The Greek Politics, Nordic Politics, Italian Politics,
French Politics, German Politics, and Parliaments Specialist Groups of the PSA
invite paper proposals for joint panels under this call. Welcome are single
case studies, comparative papers, and theoretical explorations on the above and
further questions.
The deadline for paper proposals is 12 October 2018.Please e-mail your paper proposal (paper title, 200-word abstract,
institutional affiliation and full contact details) to Davide Vampa
(d.vampa@aston.ac.uk) and Antonella Seddone (antonella.seddone@unito.it).
You are also welcome to contact us to submit an alternative
panel proposal. Please send us an abstract of the panel and, if possible,
up to four paper abstracts that are linked to the panel topic (with names and
affiliations of the proposed presenters and chair). Please make sure that the
panel proposal reflects gender diversity. All-male submissions won't be
considered. The deadline is also 12 October 2018.
Dear IPSG Members,
as some of you may have seen, details of the PSA 2019 Conference (Nottingham, 15-17 April) have been released, and call for papers and panels are now open. The IPSG will be able to propose up to four panels, and we strongly encourage all our members to participate in this process. To this end, as IPSG convenors, we have drafted two panel proposals focusing on the following themes: 1) populists in power; 2) crisis and transformation of social democracy. At this link you can find provisional panel titles and abstracts. Of course these are just preliminary ideas and we are open to comments and suggestions. For instance, the scope of the social democracy panel could be broadened to include all mainstream parties (not just centre-left ones) and their responses to changing political and socio-economic circumstances.
We would like to have an overview of proposed panels and papers one month before the official submission deadline (22 October) so that we would have enough time to advertise the panels and work with other specialist groups if the number of proposals is too large or too small.
If you are interested in participating in the next PSA conference, please contact us by 23 Septemberand let us know:
- if you would like to submit a paper proposal that you think could be included in the two proposed panels. Please send us title and abstract of the paper (and your current affiliation).
- if you would like to submit an alternative panel proposal (beyond the two included in the attachment). Please send us an abstract of the panel and, if possible, up to four paper abstracts that are linked to the panel topic (with names and affiliations of the proposed presenters and chair). Please make sure that the panel proposal reflects gender diversity. All-male submissions won't be considered. We will let you know if your panel can be included in the IPSG submission at least two weeks before the official submission deadline.
- if you would like to submit a paper proposal that is not linked to the topics suggested here but fits the broader conference theme "(Un)Sustainable Politics in a Changing World". Please send us title and abstract of the paper (and your current affiliation). We will try to identify clusters of contributions with similar focus that could be transformed into panels and let you know if your paper can be included in the IPSG submission at least two weeks before the official submission deadline.
Please note that panel and paper proposals must not exceed the 550 word limit and must be submitted in English. Clear and concise abstracts facilitate the review process.
Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions
Professor Jim Newell – IPSG founder and current co-Chair – was recently dismissed by the University of Salford, having worked there since 1991. It is no exaggeration to state that Professor Newell is the most prominent UK scholar in Italian politics: in many respects, with his work he has brought this discipline to the UK. For this reason, as the Executive Committee of the Italian Politics Specialist Group of the UK’s Political Studies Association, we were deeply surprised and dismayed by this decision and are petitioning for his reinstatement. Since the 1990s Professor Newell has organised more than 30 international conferences, events and workshops on a wide range of topics, from changing representative politics to the role of organised crime, to populism and corruption. His academic production is truly impressive: over the last 25 years he has completed 5 monographs (two are forthcoming), 11 edited volumes, 44 journal articles and 48
book chapters. In addition, he is the founding editor of Contemporary Italian Politics, has written articles for the Guardian, has appeared on BBC News, and has contributed to internationally read blogs, such as the Conversation. The decision to dismiss Professor Newell has been justified by Salford University on the basis of arbitrarily set targets concerning the capture of research funding, and what was regarded as Newell’s insufficient contribution to the University’s desire to strengthen its links with business. Most importantly, he was dismissed in accordance with market-driven performance criteria introduced by the University, unilaterally, after his appointment as a professor, and applied retroactively. The dismissal of an internationally renowned scholar for these reasons speaks volumes about the level reached by processes of marketisation of higher education in the UK. The duty of academics is to conduct good quality research and – importantly – teach and support their students. These are duties professor Newell has always taken very seriously throughout the years. There is no doubt that research grants can be useful to some, in some contexts; however, there are no guarantees that grant applications will be successful, especially now that all academics are constantly pressurised by their institutions to apply. Equally, not all research provides obvious and immediate ways for commercial exploitation, nor are academics trained to set up joint ventures with private corporations. For all these reasons, we urge The University of Salford to reconsider their decision to dismiss Professor Newell, and think again about how this will impact negatively not only on him as an academic, but also on the University of Salford’s image and international reputation. To this end, we started a petition in support of Professor Newell, asking the University of Salford’s VC to reinstate him. In a few days, the petition has been signed by over 4,000 academics (including many leading political/social scientists and not just Italian politics specialists) from all over the world. This is a clear testimony both to the reputation and respect that Professor Newell enjoys among the international academic community, and to the reckless decision made by the University of Salford. The petition can be signed at this link: chn.ge/2Jase5D, and the debate can be followed also on Twitter @PSA_IPSG.
We have no intention of giving up – not just because Professor Newell is a core member of our group, but also because if something like this can happen to an academic of his standing, then it could happen to each and every one of us. And, most importantly, this is not the kind of HE environment any of us wish to be part of.
We hope that many of you will join us, signing and sharing the petition.
After Giuseppe Conte, designated as prime minister by the populist parties League and Five Star Movement (M5S), gave up his bid to form a government on 27 May, all eyes have been on the parties that backed him and what they may do next.
Much less is being written on the party that – in theory – should
take advantage of the populists’ aborted attempt to govern: the
centre-left Democratic Party (PD). Given that both League and M5S have
run their 2018 campaign against it, it is logical to ask whether the PD
could benefit in electoral terms from the misfortunes of its critics.
The indications so far is that the very opposite is likely
to be the case. Hence, like Plato’s “Ship of Fools”, the PD may well
continue to sail towards oblivion, as it has done for months now, each of its many would-be leaders hopelessly trying to steer the ship in a different direction.
The most recent history of this party centres on the rise and fall of
Matteo Renzi, who led it between December 2013 and February 2017 (and
also served as Italy’s prime minister during some of this time). As he
took charge of it, Renzi embodied a new generation of politicians who
wanted to "scrap", as he famously said, both the old political class
that was running the PD and the country, by embarking on a series of
reforms that would prove his reformist
zeal. In fact, rather than “scrapping” the old way of doing things, his
policies offered the usual doses of neoliberalism (for instance on
employment legislation, pension reform and welfare) – in a country that had suffered badly
due to years of austerity and anemic growth. In short, and not unlike
Social-Democratic parties in other European countries, Renzi’s PD
increasingly took on the mantle of the market- and flexibility-friendly
party, while losing touch with the many people who were struggling to
make ends meet.
Having lost a referendum on complicated constitutional matters at the
end of 2016 after turning it into a referendum on himself, Renzi’s
image was irremediably tarnished, leading to him resigning the prime
ministership first, and then also (officially at least) the party
leadership. Renzi’s descending trajectory plunged the PD as a whole into
a crisis and, before the 2018 elections, the party suffered a split
with some of the party’s left-wing politicians leaving it to form a new
party.
Following the electoral defeat of March 2018 – when the PD gained
18.7% of the vote, as opposed to 25.4% in the previous election – the
party nominated Maurizio Martina as its ad interim leader. It also
postponed its much needed Conference to July. Martina is truly a
transitional figure, unable to set a clear direction to it and/or
undertake the first steps towards reform, also because the PD’s internal
factions keep constantly bickering among themselves. Instead, the key player has remained the same Renzi, who even in recent days stole the media show, by framing the events
leading to Conte’s departure as an epic battle between a “responsible”
pro-EU president (backed by the PD) and the “irresponsible”, “extremist”
M5S and League.
Leaderless and unable to forge an identity for itself after the years
of Renzi’s empty “younghism”, the PD does not appear to own any
specific policies able to address people’s problems. And how could it do
so, when it has not even decided whether to be Social-Democratic,
Liberal or both, and when it does not know whether to be the party of
the urban, educated middle classes or try to regain some of its working
class support? In the hours following Conte’s announcement that he was
not going to become prime minister after all, as M5S and League intensified
their attacks against the president, the PD was not going much further
than talking about “defending” the Constitution and the European project
against “populism”. If this is all the PD can come up with as the next
elections approach, the M5S will find it very easy to argue that it is
the party defending the banks, the EU Commission and Germany's
interference into Italian affairs, and still totally oblivious to the
plight of common people. As it stands now, the PD does not have the
strength or vision to resist this tide. The next election may well be
remembered, among other things, as the final chapter in the centre-left
party's foolish journey.
** This article was originally published by Euronews
After months of wrangling, Italy’s political crisis has a hit an
impasse, with new elections now increasingly likely. The country faces
an institutional crisis without precedent in the history of the Italian
republic. Its implications extend well beyond Italy, to the European
Union as a whole.
Since an election
on March 4, there have been endless vain attempts to form a government –
with the likely outcome changing every 24 hours. By mid-May, the Five
Star Movement (M5S) and the League, both populist parties, had come
together to draft a programme
for government featuring tax cuts and spending plans. But it sent
shivers down the spines of those contemplating Italy’s public debt –
running at over 130% of GDP – and threatened the stability of the eurozone.
They were prevented from taking office thanks to their insistence
on the appointment of the economics professor, Paolo Savona, as finance
minister. Due to Savona’s well-known eurosceptic views, Italy’s
president, Sergio Mattarella, refused to appoint him.
Although Mattarella’s decision is within the constitution, and
previous presidents have refused to appoint certain ministers before, it
is in many respects without precedent and has arguably enabled the
populists – who have a parliamentary majority – to stage a propaganda
coup. The institutional crisis has been deepened by M5S’s announcement
that it will seek to “impeach” the president and by calls from both parties for public demonstrations to protest Matarella’s decision.
The appointment
of Carlo Cottarelli, a former official from the International Monetary
Fund, as prime minister on May 28 was merely a stop-gap measure until
fresh elections in the autumn. His government will almost certainly fail
to win the necessary vote of confidence required of all incoming
governments upon taking office. This means that it will be unable to
undertake any legislative initiatives that go beyond day-to-day
administration.
Populists emboldened
Under these circumstances, campaigning for the next election will
continue throughout the summer with the far-right, anti-immigrant,
League, emboldened by a considerable jump in its opinion poll ratings.
Support for the M5S is less certain but the party is likely to
benefit from the same anti-establishment narrative that powers the
League and whose purchase has been so considerably strengthened by the
showdown with the president. The problem for M5S, which draws its
support from across the left-right spectrum, is that it has been driven
into the arms of a far-right, eurosceptic party from whose embrace it
will find it difficult to extract itself during the coming weeks. The
campaign seems bound to focus on the two themes that have given rise to
the crisis: the programme for government agreed by the two parties and
popular disaffection arising from Italy’s place in Europe.
Against this background, it’s highly likely that the upcoming
election will be widely framed as a contest between the forces of the
establishment, on the one hand, and their eurosceptic challengers on the
other.
This was suggested
by M5S leader, Luigi Di Maio, in a recent Facebook post which, in true
populist fashion, framed the issue as a basic principle of democracy:
Let us be clear about it: in this country, voting is pointless
because whatever the outcome, governments are decided upon by the
ratings agencies and the financial and banking lobbies. It is always the
same people who decide.
Constitutionalism at stake
While such rhetoric serves to fan the flames of popular resentment
and undermines the authority of Italy’s democratic institutions, it is
based on the dangerous premise that democracy is about the supremacy of
the will of a majority. Rather than – as is set out in the first article
of the Italian constitution – that democracy is the exercise of popular
sovereignty “in the forms and within the limits of the constitution”.
In this respect it reflects the unfolding of a crisis with clear
echoes elsewhere in Europe, most notably the UK, Hungary and Poland. The
Italian impasse was precipitated by populist politicians whose
challenge to the entire European integration project carries with it an
attack on the basic assumptions of liberal democracy.
Looking back on the March 4 elections, it’s difficult to think of a
more significant vote in the recent history of Europe. It was one that
has raised questions about the nature of party politics, the future of
the EU and about the nature of democracy itself in the 21st century.
After a confusing election and months of negotiations, Italy has a government once again. But don’t be surprised if it gets a new one before too long.
The two winners of the 2018 election – the Five Star Movement (M5S) and the League – have struck a deal
to form a government, making the surprise announcement that they have
chosen Giuseppe Conte, a law professor at Florence University, as prime
minister.
Apart from having been mentioned by M5S before the elections as a
possible minister, and apparently contributing to writing up the
coalition deal, Conte has no experience as a politician – he isn’t even
the leader of a party.
But, of course, that is precisely the point. Conte’s appointment
allows both parties to save face. The League can point to his expertise
in the law and conveniently ignore his contacts with M5S – hence getting
this government off the ground and showing to the electorate that it is
trying its best to provide leadership for the country. Meanwhile, M5S
can say to its members that it has, to all intents and purposes, secured
the premiership. After all, M5S did emerge as the biggest party after
the election (it gained 32% of the vote versus the League’s 17%).
The other advantage offered by this solution is that, being unknown
and having no party of his own, Conte is expected to follow the orders
issued by his political masters.
Salvini’s plan
But can this set up hold? It’s unlikely. In fact, the League’s leader
Matteo Salvini has every reason to want it to fail. That would prompt
fresh elections (say, in a couple of years at most). In the meantime, he
clearly plans to dominate the agenda for as long as Conte’s executive
survives.
There are strong clues that this is Salvini’s plan, if you know where
to look for them. In the “contract” the two parties have signed, it
says right at the beginning that the League will not be treated as the
minor partner, even though it is. Neither party can “force decisions on
their partner when it comes to issues of great importance to the
latter”.
For Salvini, that means immigration and law and order. These are also
the themes Salvini would be allowed to “own” if, as is now likely, the
president agrees that he should get the job of interior minister.
The sections of the government contract dealing with immigration, law
and order and justice are considerably longer than those addressing
themes owned by the M5S, such as reducing the cost of politics. And it’s
in these sections that the League’s repressive approach is particularly
evident.
In this document, the M5S-League alliance promises to introduce
tougher sentences for certain crimes, including when they are committed
by minors. It will strengthen the right of self-defence and send illegal
migrants “back”. There’s a plan to close what are described as
“irregular” Islamic associations and mosques and to shut down
unauthorised traveller camps. In short, these pages encapsulate
Salvini’s thinking extremely well.
Compare these pledges to the section in the contract dedicated to the
environment – a theme the M5S fully owns and which is irrelevant to its
smaller ally. Here, we find little more than a list of generic
platitudes. There are banal invitations to recycle more rubbish and
consider the virtues of the green economy, ultimately begging the
question: what can the M5S “own”, if it does not own this?
Built-in obsolescence
The League needs the M5S – and its chosen PM, Conte – to try to
implement the agenda set by Salvini, but only so that the latter can
accuse them both of betraying “the will of the people”. That would
justify bringing the government down and forcing new elections.
This time, a right-wing alliance dominated by the League could win
outright – after all, the objective was not missed by much two months
ago, and it is unlikely to be frustrated by a divided and ineffective
left. The M5S nothwistanding, therefore, such developments could lead to
Salvini being PM in the not-too-distant future. That this is Salvini’s
ultimate goal is no mystery, as “Salvini premier” is even written into
the party’s logo.
The whole game will be easier to play if Salvini does get the job of
interior minister. He could then demonstrate hyper activism on migration
and law and order, only to see his efforts constantly frustrated by his
coalition partner’s longstanding concern for human rights,
interventions by the European Court of Justice, and/or the European
Parliament.
These are exactly the challenges a previous interior minister from
the League, Roberto Maroni, had to face when serving in the 2008-2011
government. As Duncan McDonnell and I have explained in a recent book,
being attacked by the courts or international institutions can of
course strengthen a populist party’s hand, by providing evidence that
the “old elites” are at it again, frustrating “the will of the people”
with their dirty tricks.
It is political leaders that matter in Italy. However, when
“technocrats” have been given the top job before, some have tried to
break away from their masters just before an election by starting their
own party (think Mario Monti in 2013). The last thing Salvini needs now
would be for Conte to deliver on some of the promises made in the
contract, lead a united coalition and complete a full term in
government, while his profile is strengthened by success and media
exposure.
So, following an initial period during which the League will show its
“good faith” by working alongside the others, the most likely scenario
is for this government to collapse amid accusations that the programme
is not being delivered, the PM is too soft, and M5S has given in to
“Brussels”. A bolder government will be said to be needed – and the
cycle will start all over again.
The POLSIS research group (University of Birmingham) and the IPSG have organised a first discussion of the Italian election's results on 6 March 2018. Speakers: Daniele Albertazzi (University of Birmingham), Arianna Giovannini (De Montfort University) and Davide Vampa (Aston University). Listen to the podcast here.
Italy has been a populist stronghold for two and a half decades – that is since 1994, when Silvio Berlusconi
created his Forza Italia (FI) party. His goal was allegedly to “save”
the Italian people from being governed by “Communists” after the
collapse of centrist parties under the weight of anti-corruption
investigations. Having won the election in the same year, Berlusconi
then led a short-lived coalition government, with the support of the
extreme-right party the Social Movement and the regionalist populist
Lega Nord.
Fast forward 24 years to the 2018 election,
and not only is Berlusconi still FI’s leader (and indeed owner), but,
together with a renewed Lega, he has again managed to assemble an
electoral coalition that could end up in government.
However, this time there is an important twist: yet another populist
political actor was born in the meantime and now happens to be the
largest single party of all: the Five Star Movement (M5s).
Having entered the Italian political scene less than ten years ago as
an anti-establishment force, this group has struck a chord with an
electorate weighted down by the economic crisis and fed up with the
corruption of mainstream parties. In this election the party has
attracted just below one third of the votes by standing alone.
Rising stars
A first analysis of the electoral outcome should start with the undisputed winner
– that is M5s. There is no denying it has achieved an amazing result,
especially given that its performance in leading local administrations
in recent years, particularly the city of Rome, has been far from
impressive.
Having gained around 32% of the national vote, M5s has confirmed its
position as the most successful new party in the history of Western
Europe (going from 0 to 25% between 2009 and 2013, and having grown of a
further 7% in the following five years). As such, the Italian
president, Sergio Mattarella, might well feel compelled to give it a
chance to form a government before exploring the alternatives. M5S founder Beppe Grillo with the party’s proposed candidate for prime minister Luigi Di Maio.EPA
However, it is not obvious at this stage who could work with Beppe
Grillo’s party to lead the country. A solution will probably turn out to
be to reach an agreement with the Democratic Party (PD). But that’s the
very party that M5s has long identified as the source of the country’s
ills. This would be a complete reversal of the position taken by M5s
after the 2013 election, when it refused to even consider such a
possibility and went into opposition, forcing the PD to govern with FI.
The difference between then and now, however, is considerable. Back
then, the PD-led coalition had emerged from the election with 29% of the
vote – the largest share. M5s took 25%. Moreover, this coalition had a
much larger number of seats than M5s, due to the electoral law in force
at the time. This time round, the PD suffered a crushing defeat (its
vote has gone down from 25% in 2013 to 18%) and would be forced into a
supporting role if it went in to partnership with the dominant M5S. It’s
unclear why the Democrats would want to swallow such a bitter pill.
While not impossible (after all, the centre-left has a great ability to
shoot itself in the foot), I regard such a solution as very unlikely. It
would be tantamount to committing political suicide.
A right-wing alliance
Meanwhile, the right wing alliance – made up of Berlusconi’s FI,
Matteo Salvini’s Lega and Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, is by far
the largest coalition. However, the Lega has overcome FI for the first
time with an astonishing 17% of the vote (vs FI’s 14%). Feeling good: Matteo Salvini.EPA
This is very significant since the agreement between the two was that
whichever of them came on top would have a right to put forward the
prime minister. If the right eventually manages to gain the support of
enough MPs to create a government, therefore, Salvini would have to lead
it.
Salvini’s radicalism and harsh rhetoric
(particularly on immigration) makes it less likely that anyone would
want to give the right wing coalition this opportunity (and in any case,
it is not clear at this stage where such extra MPs would come from).
But having brought the party from 4% in 2013 to 17% today (the best
result ever achieved by the party, and by far) Salvini’s position within
the Lega is now unassailable.
Who governs?
With the right-wing alliance unlikely to have enough seats to govern
on its own and voters so obviously fed up with mainstream parties, it
now looks at least possible that, despite their differences, the Lega
and M5s may want to explore the possibility of governing together. This
would be very difficult for the Lega, as the party would need to ditch
its well tested alliance with FI, one that has served it well during
many years.
Such a move would be further complicated by the fact that the two
right-wing allies (and their minor ally, Brothers of Italy) have fielded
coalition candidates together, since, under the new electoral law, one
third of the seats are selected from single-member districts (SMDs)
according to a plurality rule. It is true that each of the candidates
came from one of these parties and, ultimately, is loyal to them,
however they have received the support of all right-wing voters. If the
Lega ignored this and agreed to join M5s in government, Berlusconi would
accuse them of betraying the electorate.
In the end, what we are left with while we still wait for the final
results to be confirmed is the certainty that populism continues to
dominate Italian politics. Everything else is a question mark.
by Arianna Giovannini** It is still too early to make a full assessment of the results
from last night’s general election in Italy, but what is clear is that
the country emerges from this election as profoundly divided. There is a clear fault line between the centre-North, which is going to the centre-right coalition and the South,
who voted en mass for the Five Star Movement. What unites these ‘two
Italies’ is a support for anti-establishment forces. Turnout is in
decline (around 73 per cent, against 75 per cent of 2013), but still
quite high compared to other European countries. The Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle – M5S) has emerged, as
many anticipated, as the main single political force – gaining,
according to the projected vote so far, around 31.5 and 32 percent in
both chambers. This is well above expectations, and it is a monumental
result for the Movement, which contested its first general election in
2013 achieving an already phenomenal 25 per cent of votes. Yet M5S is still short of the majority needed to form a government
(40 per cent) according to the new electoral law. The interesting point
to note here is that for the first time the Movement is willing to go
against its golden rule of intransigence against coalitions, and it has
invited other political forces to seek a dialogue with them – although
at their own terms and conditions. This could lead to a ‘coalition game’
that could be dangerous for the M5S. So, what are M5S’s options? They could enter negotiations with Matteo
Salvini’s Lega (14%) or with Matteo Renzi’s Democratic Party (PArtito
Democratic – PD), who achieved 19%. Either way, this could be damaging
the M5S as it would force it to either develop an alliance with
far-right forces such as the Lega (something that many of its supporters
would not welcome) or to enter a pact with ‘the devil’, i.e. the party
that embodies the establishment against which the M5S has fought since
day one, the PD. The centre-right is the coalition with the largest share of vote in
the Senate and in the Chamber of Deputies (estimated at around 36 per
cent). This was predictable – but what many commentators did not foresee
was that the League led by Matteo Salvini would gain more support
(above 18 per cent) than Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (nearly 14 per
cent). This is, again, a momentous result for the League – which went from 4
to 18 percent in 5 years. In its strongholds, such as Veneto in Italy’s
north, the Lega is likely to gain up to 33 per cent – an unprecedented
result. In practical terms, this means that Berlusconi has been defeated and
he won’t be the kingmaker of the next government. It also means that if
the right wing coalition holds, Matteo Salvini would become the most
likely candidate prime minister. What remains to be seen is what
position Salvini will take. He’s faced with two choices: he could either
stick to the right-wing coalition or break away and seek a dialogue
with the M5S. The clear loser of this election is centre-left. The PD led by former
PM Matteo Renzi has been swept away. Renzi has managed to take the
party from boom to bust in a matter of few years, and the PD is emerging
from this election in ashes (estimated at around 19 per cent, and
possibly the fourth political force in both chambers – the lowest result
in the history of the party). Renzi’s day of reckoning seems to be
looming, and if the PD was to enter coalition negotiations with the M5S
it would almost certainly be under a new leader. Overall, no single political force or coalition is currently in a
position to form a government. Thus, the next hours (and possibly days)
will be crucial. If we stick to the maths, there are only two coalitions
that could form a government: M5S and PD or a M5S, Lega and Brothers of
Italy. Neither of these would lead to an easy-to-manage and stable
government, and internal and external turbulences would be most likely
to emerge. The President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella will soon
have to chose who will form the next government – he could go for one of
these two coalition options, or opt for a technocratic, transitional
government of ‘national unity’ with a clear remit (e.g. review the
electoral law). Either way, we are at an important turning point in Italian politics:
traditional parties on both sides of the political spectrum have been
marginalised, and the new, anti-establishment forces are going, one way
or another, to have a key role in the next government. Some commentators
have already presented this as the birth of a ‘Third Republic’
under the banner of populism. Whether this accurate or too far fetched
an argument will become clearer only in the next few days.
** This article was originally published on PSA Blog.
Italy’s new electoral law – used for the first time in this
weekend’s election – could have a wide-ranging impact on the country’s
politics by Dario Quattromani**
By the end of Sunday 4th March Italian voters will discover a lot more about themselves than they have known for years, thanks to their brand new electoral law whose main target is to represent them in the new Parliament, rather than allowing the formation of a parliamentary majority to rule their country. This is the result of an historical process of 25 years of electoral reforms. This process started in 1993 with the majoritarian turn of the so-called ‘Mattarellum’; followed by the less appreciated ‘Porcellum’ in 2005 which was declared partially unconstitutional in 2014 and subsequently substituted by the so called ‘Italicum‘ (only valid for the Chamber of Deputies because it was tied to the (failed) constitutional reform of 2016; then finally, during 2017 the Constitutional Court ruled that this electoral law was partially conflicting with the Italian Constitution, and so in the last few months of the 17th legislature Italian MPs were focused on the production of a new electoral law before the scheduled 2018 general elections. Comparing past and present electoral systems It is important to consider the circumstances under which Italian MPs reformed their national electoral system in 1993. A few months earlier many politicians of parties in government had been found guilty of being financed by private entrepreneurs in order to facilitate their affairs. Considering how this situation connected with the party-system, Italian public opinion called for a change to the electoral law, thus leading the Parliament to establish for the first-time-ever a mixed system characterized by 75% of plurality (first-past-the-post) and 25% of proportional representation to elect MPs in the following 1994, 1996 and 2001 general elections. As a result of this new electoral law, Italians experienced the growth of a bipolar political system, deciding to vote for either electoral coalitions mainly representing the centre-right and the centre-left of the political spectrum. When it became enough clear that the ‘Mattarellum’ was going to let the main opposition win the following 2006 elections, Berlusconi’s majority passed a new electoral law in 2005: the so called ‘Porcellum’, a proportional system with a majority bonus for the first party/coalition (at national level for the lower chamber, at regional level for the Senate) which was used in the 2006, 2008 and 2013 general elections. The main targets of the 17th legislature elected in February 2013 were a set of reforms to move the country on from the post-financial crisis period: although public expenditures and economic growth were at the top of the to-do-list most of the reformist activity was dedicated to the elaboration of a new electoral law, the ‘Italicum’, which was strictly connected with the constitutional reform proposed by the Prime Minister Renzi. Once the Constitutional Referendum did not pass in 2016 a new electoral law needed to be prepared by the Parliament, since the two existing ones derived from sentences of the Constitutional Court on the ‘Porcellum’ (for the Senate) and the ‘Italicum’ (for the Chamber of Deputies). After a first attempt to pass a new law failed in June 2017 a fresh attempt after the summer saw both chambers approve (with 8 votes of confidence) the new ‘Rosatellum’ electoral law.
Main points of the Rosatellum – Effects on candidacies; interplay at the regional level; poll results The new Italian electoral law, so called ‘Rosatellum’ because of the deputy (Ettore Rosato) who presented the draft law, is a mixed system (64% proportional – 36% majoritarian), incorporating the main requirements deriving from the two sentences of the Constitutional Court on the previous electoral laws. This new law abandoned the idea of seeking to assure that a ruling majority could be formed, thus heading towards a representative aim; it harmonized the different electoral laws ruling the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies; and finally, it was the expression of the Italian Parliament. One of the big electoral changes after 1992/1993 was the search for a governing majority, and this move back to proportional representation in the new law has not been appreciated enough nationwide. Harmonizing both chambers’ electoral laws let the critics remind people that at the very beginning of Italian republic the two chambers were designed to have different electors, members and characteristics (although, most of these differences only lasted until 1953). Although it was only approved with 8 votes of confidence by both chambers, allowing its critics to undermine the validity of the procedure, more parliamentarians voted for the Rosatellum than any other Italian electoral law.
The Rosatellum has a range of new features which are worth us considering: Providing the return to the ‘power of coalitions’ (which the ‘Italicum’ abandoned), the Rosatellum has three main national thresholds for parties to participate in the distribution of seats in Parliament: 1) parties under 1% of the national vote do not have any representation; 2) those parties forming a coalition who receive a percentage of votes between 1% and 3% add their results to the coalition, but without receiving seats; 3) coalitions that include at least one party who received more than 3%, have to reach 10% of the ballots in order to receive seats. Candidacies for the national seats (618 for the lower Chamber, 309 for the Senate) are restricted to one per party in the single-member constituencies (116 for the Senate and 232 for the Chamber) and up to five in the multi-member constituencies. It is very interesting to analyze the criteria for the allocation of the seats, since it is straightforward that winners in the plurality do get that seat, but where this were not the case, they could gain election in a constituency where they received a lower number of votes. One more restriction, is that voters are now not able to choose a party list while voting for candidates (gender equality being provided) of other political forces outside of the coalition: this is going to be an interesting point when observing, in the same day, how many votes will be cancelled in the two Italian regions voting with different rules (Lazio and Lombardia), since enduring habits are extremely hard to win. Finally, it is relevant, for the reasons behind it and the effects that this measure will produce, to consider the introduction of an antifraud voting card. Its introduction is a recognition of the practice of selling votes and sends a message to those who relied on this to guarantee their results, yet it will probably slowdown electoral procedures, thus implying possible traffic and queueing at polling stations.
In summary, after all these points, a few questions could arise:
Due to the rules for allocation of the seats, which seats will candidates be elected for? Some solution that have been adopted can be read here;
What will the differences be for voting national and regional? A useful answer would come from some examples of coalition-making at both levels: whereas M5S (Five Star Movement) does not seek to make coalitions anywhere, centre-left and centre-right coalitions are not composed by the same parties (ex-PD members who gave birth to a new left movement – LeU -, are running alone in areas where the Democratic Party is likely to do badly – Parliament and Lombardia -, but they are running together in Lazio where the Democratic Party is set to do well), and this varies because of the level of administration (State/Region) and the geographical position (North-Centre/South);
With the target of the new law to represent Italians rather than assuring a majority to govern Italy for five years, what are the possible scenarios? While numbers during all the electoral campaign have been very stable at a macro level, observable variations could be found inside the coalitions, especially the centre-right, with Berlusconi’s Forza Italia acting as the frontrunner of its coalition, necessary for expressing his candidate for the Premiership, the actual President of the European Parliament Antonio Tajani.
** This article was originally posted on the SPERI website as part of an IPSG blog series on the 2018 general election. Over the coming week more blogs will be posted which will be available to read here.
