Torn between centre-left respectability and anti-establishment
protest, the Italian radical left struggles to devise a coherent and
appealing political project
The
electoral campaign of the forthcoming Italian election on 4 March 2018
is being dominated by three main poles: a centre-right coalition led by
Forza Italia (FI) and Lega Nord (Lega); the anti-establishment Movimento
5 Stelle (M5S), running alone; and a centre-left coalition led by the
Partito Democratico (PD). Most radical left and left-wing organisations
are running for office outside of these three poles. Some have converged
in the list of Liberi e Uguali (LeU), others have given birth to the
competing list of Potere al Popolo (PaP), and three smaller groups are
fielding candidates in parts of the country. Despite a relatively
favourable social and political environment, characterised by an economy
still working below the levels of 2007, widespread dissatisfaction with
all established parties, a good salience of traditional left-wing
issues over the past few years, and major left-wing splits from the PD,
these lists are not expected to have a major impact on the election.
Voting intentions in the week from 10 to 16 February, the last
available before the pre-election ban on opinion polls, estimate the
support of LeU to be around 5.6 per cent of valid votes, the support of
PaP around 1.5 per cent (but this is quite volatile, with polls ranging
from below 0.5 to 2.7 per cent), and the smaller lists are ignored
completely. Unlike their counterparts in the Southern European radical
left (e.g. SYRIZA, Podemos, and the France Insoumise) or in mainstream
Labour parties (e.g. Jeremy Corbyn and his supporters), they have so far
failed to attract a surge of public interest, mobilisation, and
support. Why?
From 2007 to 2017: the missed opportunity of the Great Recession
The catastrophic defeat of the 2008 general election still looms
large on the state of the Italian radical left. In that year, its total
vote shrunk from 7.9 to 4.4 per cent and, for the first time since 1945,
no radical left MP was elected. Deprived of national parliamentary
representation, weakened electorally and organisationally, and divided
in a multiplicity of rival organisations, the radical left completely missed the window of opportunity opened by the Great Recession
and watched helplessly the emergence of a new party representing
widespread protest against austerity and the political establishment:
the Five Star Movement.
In 2013, the more conciliatory wing of the radical left (Sinistra
Ecologia Libertà, SEL) managed to return to Parliament thanks to an
alliance with Bersani’s PD, but with little electoral weight (3.2 per
cent of valid votes) and overall influence (solitary opposition). The
more intransigent wing built a short-lived list (Rivoluzione Civile, RC)
which gathered 2.2 per cent of valid votes and no seats;
anti-capitalist lists stopped at 0.3 per cent.
In the following years, this fragmented landscape of more or less
radical left-wing organisations sought to benefit from the explosive
socio-economic legacy left by the Monti government (2011–13) and the
subsequent ‘grand coalition’ or centrist governments led by the
Democratic Party (Letta, Renzi, and Gentiloni): GDP and wage stagnation,
high unemployment and poverty, drastic austerity measures, and major
reforms of the pension system and of labour law.
Moreover, several attempts were made to reunite the radical left in a
common party or coalition and to integrate the dissidents which started
to leave the PD in droves as Matteo Renzi’s hold over the party
consolidated. However, efforts on both fronts achieved little success.
Programmatically, the radical left remained divided on all key issues:
first, the relationship with the PD, where intransigent advocates of a
clean break faced conciliatory advocates for a ‘new centre-left
(coalition)’, with or without Renzi; secondly, the attitude toward the
M5S, where supporters and opponents of forms of collaboration clashed
with each other; and, finally, the attitude toward the European Union,
where far-fetched ideas of a progressive ‘other Europe’ coexisted with
minority opinions advocating ‘disobedience’ against many EU treaties and
even an exit from the Eurozone. Electorally, this oscillation between
centre-left respectability and anti-establishment protest reduced the
appeal of the radical left, whose potential voters drifted toward
abstention or preferred to chose the more clear-cut options of either
the Democratic Party or the Five Star Movement.
The run-up of the 2018 election: Liberi e Uguali and its discontents
In 2017–18, the official split from the Democratic Party of an
important section of its former post-communist and social democratic
leadership, including party secretaries Massimo D’Alema, Pierluigi
Bersani, and Guglielmo Epifani, upset the delicate balance between
radical left organisations. The resulting splinter party, Articolo 1 –
Movimento Democratico e Progressista (MDP), rapidly gained a hegemonic
position in this field, attracted the former SEL (now Sinistra Italiana,
SI) and Civati’s Possibile as its junior allies, and ultimately formed
the backbone of the new electoral list Liberi e Uguali
(Free and Equal). The list chose the President of the Chamber of
Deputies Pietro Grasso (independent formerly close to PD) as its leader,
drafted a traditional social democratic programme
centred on public investment, redistribution, and expansion of the
welfare state, and adopted a Corbyn-like rhetoric (‘for the many, not
the few’).
The dominance of people who had been part of centrist governmental
majorities until a few months before the election and who did not
identify with traditional European radical left networks (e.g. GUE/NGL
and PEL), however, did not satisfy everyone. These discontents, which
included two neo-communist parties (Partito della Rifondazione
Comunista, PRC, and the recently rechristened Partito Comunista
Italiano, PCI) and further sections of the extra-parliamentary radical
left (centri sociali, radical trade unions, ‘LULU’ movements,
anti-capitalist political organisations, and so on), initially took part
in the discussions geared at establishing a common electoral list with
its more moderate partners, but coalesced at the last minute around a
separate list launched by the Neapolitan squat Je so’ Pazzo and called Potere al Popolo! (Power to the People!). The list chose the unknown university researcher Viola Carofalo as its leader, drafted a pugnacious programme of anti-neoliberal opposition, and drew some rhetorical inspiration from contemporary left populism.
Three other radical left lists are also running in 2018, but are
present in less than 60 per cent of the constituencies: Rizzo’s Partito Comunista (PC), Ferrando’s and Bellotti’s Per una Sinistra Rivoluzionaria (SR), and Ingroia’s Lista del Popolo per la Costituzione (LPC).
During the electoral campaign, the two main radical left actors have gained some media exposure through Grasso’s proposal of scrapping the tuition fees and with the anti-fascist demonstrations of 18 February,
but their core socio-economic message has been inaudible.
Anti-austerity and anti-establishment protest remains solidly
appropriated by the Five Star Movement, despite its moderate turn under
Luigi Di Maio, and by Salvini’s Lega, which combines xenophobic
(‘Italians first!’) and pro-business (a 15 per cent flat tax on income)
policy planks with an economic programme
focused on Keynesian stimulus, state intervention, and social
protection. Moreover, the campaign of LeU has been marred by ominous
strategic disagreements on its future course: independent party or
potential ally of a ‘new centre-left’ without Renzi? Opposition or
governmental participation? In the latter case, together with the PD,
the M5S, or within an all-party ‘President’s government’?
Perspectives
If the final election results reflect the latest voting intentions,
the outcome will be deeply unsatisfactory for the Italian radical left:
only LeU will gain seats, and a modest increase in vote shares compared
to 2013 will have been purchased at the price of a complete
subordination to the moderate leadership of former PD officials.
Moreover, the strategic ambiguity of the LeU coalition makes it liable
to a sudden explosion after the election, should its seats become
necessary to form a viable governmental majority. PaP, in turn, may
still end up being the last episode in a long series of short-lived and
unsuccessful electoral coalitions forged by the PRC to recover some of
its former power and parliamentary representation.
More importantly, the Italian radical left has yet to develop a
coherent and credible response to the crisis of the neo-liberal and
Europeanised developmental model pursued by the country since the early
1990s. Vague appeals against stagnation, inequality, and austerity are
not enough, if concrete plans (no matter if at a national or at an
EU-wide level) vis-à-vis public ownership, deficit spending, state
intervention, monetary and economic sovereignty, regulation of trade and
capital flows, and similar matters remain sorely absent.
To sum up, and barring unexpected surprises, the 2018 general
election does not seem likely to revive the fortunes of the Italian
radical left, nor to deliver it from its current state of fragmentation,
programmatic weakness, and strategic confusion.
** This article was originally posted on the SPERI website
as part of an IPSG blog series on the 2018 general election. Over the
coming week more blogs will be posted which will be available to read here.
Populist ‘elites vs the people’ narratives are playing upon rising Euroscepticism and concerns about immigration
Recent comment pieces and public opinion data
address the increasing dissatisfaction with the European Union (EU)
among Italian citizens. Although Italy has always been presented and is
well known as one of the most Euro-enthusiast countries, levels of public Euroscepticism
have started to increase since the first wave of the economic crisis.
This contribution examines the rise of public Euroscepticism and
addresses the most salient issues among Italian voters, how these are
being addressed by some political parties and to what extent they can
also explain current attitudes both towards the domestic situation and
the EU.
In an analysis on the European Parliament (EP) elections Fabio Serricchio
observes that, in Italy, enthusiasm towards the EU has been smoothly
declining. Although participation at the European Parliament (EP)
elections is still high (65 per cent) compared to the EU average turnout
is high only within a synchronic perspective, whilst a comparison to
the first EP elections in 1979 shows a drop in turnout of about 20 per
cent. This overlaps with more political and social domestic
controversial debates, and the emergence of soft Euroscepticism at the elite level,
where extreme positions have been taken to support withdrawal from the
Eurozone and hard opposition towards the main policy pillars of the EU.
Domestic contestation has increased the salience of Europe, with political actors pointing to the ‘total failure’
of the EU. Withdrawal from the EU is not an option being put forward by
any official political party in Italy, and the Movimento 5 stelle (Five
Star Movement – M5s) candidate Prime Minister, Luigi Di Maio
stresses that leaving the EU would be just a ‘last resort’. The party
stance reveals a new form of opposition that is becoming more widespread
across Europe, not just among civil society, and has been defined by John FitzGibbon
as ‘Euroalternativism’. This represents a pro-systemic (critical)
opposition to Europe that would suggest alternative policies and
institutional reforms, while still supporting EU membership. In the case
of the M5s, currently forecast to receive the most votes on March 4th,
it generally refers to the social costs of the Eurozone and the much
salient issue of immigration from North Africa. Luigi Di Maio’s campaign
has identified, similarly to Matteo Salvini, leader of the Lega, that
the most salient issues across the electorate are immigration,
disengagement with politics and Euroalternativism.
Although the data in Table 1 is from 2013, an overview of the views
of all Italian and M5s voters can still be telling. Italians and M5s
voters are no longer particularly positive towards EU membership, while
the M5s electorate tends to think that people elected in Parliament
quickly lose touch and parties tend to be interested in people’s votes,
not their opinions, possibly showing higher levels of distrust towards
the Parliament and political elites.
Further, both M5s voters and average Italian voters tend to see
immigration as a resource. Overall, a descriptive overview of the
positioning of the Italian voter vs. the M5s electorate does not see
much variation on environmentalism and both electorates are not likely
to take a strong stance on whether immigrants should adapt to the
Italian customs. Conversely, economic paternalism and distrust for
parties and institutions, with increasingly contested debates about
rising employment rates and flows of immigration are currently shifting
the political narrative on security, but also on welfare and the job
market, and these are likely to represent salient issues, in particular
for M5s voters.
Figure 1. Most salient issues (EB88 2017)
Looking at a similar question and addressing the salient issues at
both the EU and national levels, data in Figure 1 from 2017 shows that
immigration and terrorism are salient issues at the EU level. At the
national level, more than immigration, Italians are most concerned with
unemployment. Immigration is the second most salient issue, while the
overall economic situation and pensions further show the extent of
concerns about the economy within Italian public opinion.
Issue of identity and the economy also featured in a previous analysis I conducted with Fabio Serricchio,
where we found that support for the EU in Italy is strongly determined
by identity. The identity dimension is relative to (i) an individual’s
experience of Europe – and answering questions on respecting national
law and institutions, mastering one of the official languages, and
exercise of citizens’ rights, like being active in the politics of any
country – and further determinant factors are represented by (ii) their
trust towards Europeans and the idea that (iii) Europe benefits people
like them.
To go back to our initial questions, on attitudes towards both the
domestic situation and the EU, and how the most salient issues for
voters are addressed in the political debates, the analysis demonstrates
that a campaign based solely around immigration is not likely to be
fully successful, but that attitudes about immigration can be reinforced
by an ‘elites vs. the people’ debate, as both the Lega and M5s are
currently pursuing. This narrative has also been adopted by Silvio
Berlusconi, who points to the relaxed attitude of the centre-left
towards immigration, and fuels fears and concerns towards security. He
has addressed himself as ‘the most Europeanist leader of all, born
in-between two World Wars.’, asserting that ‘Europe has secured 70 years
of peace and security’, while he points to an alternative idea of
Europe, ‘…[that] needs to become less bureaucratic, and more a demoi’s Europe.’ (Interview at Radio Capital, 8th February 2018)
As Prime Minister, Berlusconi influenced a new emerging
Euroalternativist or soft Eurosceptic debate, using a confrontational
attitude towards the EU, and whilst today he seems to still maintain
this tone he does so with a milder attitude. Europe, as the Italians,
seem to be remote in these elections, with the exception of a more
pronounced European agenda in +Europa, led by Emma Bonino, currently
forecast at 2.6 percent, and presenting the idea of a Federalist Europe
as a way to stop the increasing success of radical right populism. This
does not seem to matter for Italian citizens, 43 per cent (compared to 29 per cent in the EU) do not feel like a EU citizen.
If a strong determinant is likely to be represented by the idea that
Europe benefits people like them, cues to political parties seem to come
from debates around the challenging relationship with political parties
and institutions, immigration and a Euroalternative narrative.
** This article was originally posted on the SPERI website
as part of an IPSG blog series on the 2018 general election. Over the
coming week more blogs will be posted which will be available to read here.
Italy’s parties are engaging in complex
official and unofficial coalition building. The outcome will determine
who will form and lead Italy’s next government
by Anna Cento Bull and Galadriel Ravelli**
The forthcoming Italian political elections, due to take place on 4 March 2018, are both unpredictable
and likely to have major repercussions both within the country and in
Europe as a whole. This is due in great part to the new electoral law
approved in 2017, which introduced a hybrid system of allocating seats,
mainly based on proportional representation, making it virtually
impossible for any of the current competing parties and alliances to
gain a majority. It is also due to the fact that among the contendents
are deeply Eurosceptic parties like the League (formerly the Lega Nord)
and the 5 Star Movement.
According to most experts, a party or coalition needs to achieve at
least 40% of the votes to have a chance to form a government. Successive
polls have indicated that the centre-right coalition, made up of four
‘legs’, including Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, Matteo Salvini’s
League and Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia, is the only competitor
with a (slight) chance of reaching that threshold. The 5 Star Movement,
led by Luigi Di Maio, continues to enjoy much electoral support but is
not likely to obtain more than 30% of the votes. As for the Democratic
Party (PD), led by Matteo Renzi and currently in government under the
premiership of Paolo Gentiloni, it seems to be losing ground and may well end up in third place.
This is due at least in part to a haemorrhage of its voters to the
leftist alliance, Liberi e Uguali (LEU), which the PD has attempted to
remedy by allying with small centrist parties.
If the centre-right coalition fails to gain a majority, a likely
situation of impasse will emerge from the ballot box. In this context,
we are witnessing two different types of political behaviour in Italy.
On the one hand, there is the official electoral campaign, which sees
four different actors competing against each other, each ostensibly
ruling out possible coalitions apart from the already established ones.
On the other hand, at an unofficial level, the behaviour of the various
contendents seems to point to alternative alliances being taken into
consideration and even facilitated, as various commentators have pointed
out.
One aspect of this behaviour concerns the adoption by most party
leaders of the model of the ‘personal party’, first developed by
Berlusconi when he launched Forza Italia in 1994. Thus Mauro Calise has argued
that Renzi, Berlusconi, Salvini and Di Maio have all ensured that
mainly loyal candidates are included in their lists, hence minimising
the likelihood of internal defections should they opt to construct a
governing alliance with parties they fought against during the electoral
campaign. Another sign of this type of unofficial political activity
appeared to be the decision by both the PD and Forza Italia to refrain
from putting up strong candidates against each other in the central and
southern constituencies. As Ugo Magri pointed out: ‘The aim is not to hurt each other too much, the hidden agenda being already orientated towards a “post-election” context’.
Some commentators have pointed
out that the PD and its coalition allies have welcomed at least 20
former supporters of Berlusconi, who might play a key role in fostering
an alliance between the centre-right and the centre-left coalitions in
Parliament.
This unofficial type of activity has found resonance in (and in turn
been fuelled by) the national and international media, thus increasing
the already high degree of uncertainty surrounding these elections and
fuelling speculation as to the kind of coalition government that will
be formed after polling day. Any permutation seems possible, including a
possible alliance between the 5 Star Movement and the League, as well
as the much-touted alliance between Forza Italia and the PD, despite
repeated denials by the leaders themselves.
The main question revolves around the centre-right coalition. Should
it win outright, this coalition promises to be even more quarrelsome
than its previous incarnations, particularly since the League has veered
sharply to the right while Berlusconi has seemingly adopted a more
moderate and centrist position. The only exception appears to be the
issue of immigration, as the two leaders have consistently echoed each
other, even more so after the recent terrorist attack against migrants
in Macerata.
Marcello Pera, Forza Italia Senator and former President of the Senate, has gone as far as to argue that
Berlusconi, Salvini and Meloni ‘don’t have any shared programmes,
ideas, perspectives. They don’t agree on Europe, immigration, taxes or
pensions’. In his view, while Berlusconi is working hard to ensure Forza
Italia becomes the largest party within the centre-right coalition, he
is in fact hoping not to end up having to govern with his current
partners but aiming instead at an alternative coalition (with the PD and
centrists). Indeed according to Claudio Tito in an article for La Repubblica published on 28 January 2018
and entitled ‘Le larghe intese a Bruxelles’, Berlusconi had reassured
Italy’s EU partners that he would not govern with Salvini. The latter
immediately labelled this article as ‘fake news’.
As for the 5 Star Movement, there have been allegations that Di Maio
was seriously considering an alliance with the League, as the one that
could realistically command a majority in parliament. While denying this
speculation, Di Maio has stated that he would be open to an agreement
with other parties based on a number of key policies, thus putting an
end to the Movement’s isolationist stance. However, a leading expert on
the League, Piergiorgio Corbetta, has dismissed such allegations on the basis that the two parties have little in common.
The frenzy of speculation is destined to grow, as polling day gets
nearer. Commentators seem to agree in predicting post-electoral
scenarios in which opposing factions might join forces and set up
unconvincing coalitions. Leadership remains a key, unresolved issue. For
different reasons, none of the leaders of the main parties seems to
represent a suitable candidate for presiding over a post-electoral
coalition of any nature.
Within the centre right no decision has been taken concerning the
future premiership, although the leaders have agreed that the party with
the most votes will designate the prime minister. Based on current
opinion polls, Forza Italia should emerge as the largest party within
this coalition. However, as is widely known, the Severino law
does not allow Berlusconi to run for office until 2019, due to a fiscal
fraud conviction in 2013. By contrast, Salvini has run a highly
personalised campaign revolving around his future premiership role.
Within the PD-led alliance, too, it remains unclear who might be put
forward as premier. While Gentiloni, the current prime minister,
commands much support among the public, Renzi is evidently not willing
to forgo the possibility of reclaiming this role for himself.
Such issues may well be magnified in case of broader coalitions.
However, it may be possible to find a convergence around the current
prime minister. After variously ambiguous remarks concerning leadership,
in fact, on 9 February Berlusconi finally stated that
in the event of inconclusive results he would welcome a provisional
government run by Gentiloni. While Gentiloni himself has rejected the
idea of a coalition government with the centre-right, he has pragmatically underlined
that the latter is currently composed of ‘a conservative wing and two
anti-Europe and populist wings’. The current prime minister seems to
evoke once again a possible break-up of the centre-right coalition, with
Forza Italia repudiating its ‘awkward’ allies and joining a coalition
led by himself.
As regards a possible post-electoral coalition between the 5 Star
Movement and the League, it goes without saying that here too leadership
remains an open question. As previously argued, the League’s campaign
has focused almost entirely upon Salvini’s personal leadership and claim
to the premiership. In December 2017, in fact, the party launched a new electoral symbol
with the slogan ‘Salvini Premier’, which has since informed all its
publicity. Should Salvini join forces with the 5 Star Movement in a
coalition government run by Di Maio, this might jeopardise his hold over
the party. Di Maio’s leadership, in turn, might come under fire if he
opted for an alliance with the League.
Italian politics is well known for the ‘eternal return’ of
transformism, which has shaped parliamentary majorities for more than a
century, including the recent legislatures. Between March 2013 and
December 2017, in fact, 207 deputies and 140 senators defected from one party or group to another at least once
(and often more than once), a trend that has also involved a number of
5 Star Movement parliamentarians. In light of the uncertain
post-electoral scenario, it remains to be seen whether transformist
behaviour will impact upon all parties and whether it will determine the
next government.
** This article was originally posted on the SPERI website
as part of an IPSG blog series on the 2018 general election. Over the
coming week more blogs will be posted which will be available to read here.
by Daniele Albertazzi and Arianna Giovannini**
In under three weeks time Italy will return to the polls for what promises to be another controversial general election, with immigration and the state of the economy having been afforded a prominent place in the electoral campaign. To get an idea of how polarising and divisive the current debate is in the country, just consider the response of right wing parties to the attack that took place in Macerata at the beginning of February. After a gunman with extreme right wing views opened fire on six black migrants, the blame was put firmly and squarely at the left’s door for allegedly failing to ‘control migration’. Thus the Lega Nord’s (Northern League, LN) leader Matteo Salvini remarked that ‘uncontrolled migration generates chaos, rage and social conflict’. The reaction of his allies, including Silvio Berlusconi, was very similar.
The debate has considerably heated up as far as the Italian economy is concerned, too, with a similar process of scapegoating taking place, whereby Italy’s economic problems have conveniently been blamed almost entirely on the Euro and the inflexibility of the EU. Of course, Italy is not at all unique in doing this – as migration and the EU have been the focus of campaigns all around Europe in recent years, but condoning almost lethal attacks against innocent bystanders takes the debate to a completely different level.
This scenario is further complicated by the complexities of the new electoral law (a mix of first-past-the-post and proportional representation), which, in practice, makes it very difficult to deliver a clear outcome and, in turn, to predict what kind of coalition will lead the country. Rather than speculating on the possible results, in this blog we focus on the main political actors competing in this election, in order to understand ‘how we got to where we are now’ and ‘where parties/candidates are at’.
Partito Democratico (Democratic Party, PD).
The recent history of the PD, the pivotal party on the left, centres on the rise and fall of its actual leader, Matteo Renzi. As he took charge of the party in 2013, Renzi embodied a new generation of politicians who wanted to ‘scrap’, as he famously claimed, both the old political class that was running his party and running the country. Having replaced Enrico Letta as the head of the PD-led government, Renzi did extremely well in the European election held in the spring of 2014 and, keen to show he meant business, embarked on a series of reforms (such as employment legislation and welfare) in the months that followed. However, having lost a referendum on complicated constitutional matters in 2016, after turning it into a vote on himself by promising to resign in case of defeat, his image was irremediably tarnished. This plunged the PD into a crisis and, in 2017, the party suffered a split with some of the party’s left-wing politicians leaving to form a new party. According to polls that have been remarkably consistent for years, the PD will almost certainly lack the numbers to create a centre-left coalition after the election. The party’s lack of focus during the campaign and inability to concentrate on few and clear themes have not helped either.
Forza Italia (Forward Italy, FI)
Forza Italia means Silvio Berlusconi, the media entrepreneur who created it in 1994, merged it with another party in 2008 to create the People of Freedom party, and revived it again in 2013. Following the premature end of his fourth government in 2011 and a conviction for tax fraud in 2013, Berlusconi kept a low profile for some years but never ‘went away’, as many international media mistakenly argued, as he remained firmly in charge of his party. At around 16-17%, FI’s support is currently a fraction of the People of Freedom’s 37% in 2008, but Berlusconi’s advantage is the pivotal part played by FI. It is, in fact, very likely that FI’s MPs will be needed for the creation of the next government, whether the party forms a right wing coalition alongside the LN and others, or whether it enters a coalition government with the PD due to the vote delivering a hung Parliament. Either way, Berlusconi should be able to emerge as the kingmaker (right now, he would not be able to serve as Prime Minister because of the aforementioned conviction disqualifying him from public office, but he has appealed). Unlike the PD, Berlusconi has campaigned relentlessly on a small number of themes that target his constituency of middle class and retired voters, housewives, and the unemployed. Hence, his forays into using very harsh language on migration notwithstanding, he has put up the image of the “reassuring elder statesman” and campaigned on a platform of tax cuts, more jobs and pension increases. The fact that the FI’s leader did not deliver on very similar promises in the past (he oversaw an increase of the tax burden as PM for eight years between 2001 and 2011) does not seem to matter too much. Support for his party is steadily growing in the polls – also due to the weaknesses, divisions and confused campaigning of the left.
Lega Nord (Northern League, LN)
Despite being the oldest party in the Italian political system, the Lega is going into the general election with a completely new identity. The change in leadership, following a fraud scandal that led to the resignation of the party’s founding father Umberto Bossi, saw the ascent of Matteo Salvini in 2013. This has, in practice, coincided with an unprecedented shift in the ideology and agenda of what, until then, had been a ‘regionalist populist party’. Under Bossi, the LN represented the ‘hard-working people of Northern Italy’ against the corrupted political elites in Rome and southern Italians. Thus, it challenged the vertical organisation of power within the Italian state, campaigning for northern territorial autonomy. Crucially, Salvini has transformed the LN into a ‘national Lega’, which can now be best described as a nativist-populist right-wing party. Under Salvini, the ‘fight for the North’ has gradually disappeared from the party’s agenda. This has culminated in the dropping of the term ‘North’ from the party’s electoral symbol, but also the creation of a parallel organisation (‘Lega for Salvini Premier’) which aims to represent the whole country. Issues such as immigration, security, law and order are now at the core of the LN’s political message, while the EU/Brussels has taken the place of ‘Rome’ as the elites that need defeating.
Polls suggest that the Lega should fare well on 4 March (by gaining around 13% of the vote, up from about 4% in the previous general election). The actual result will be key to determine: i) whether the LN as we knew it will disappear completely (if it fared very well the ‘northern factions’ of the party might – albeit grudgingly – get behind the ranks of Salvini’s new party) or if it will split into two parties (Salvini’s ‘national league’ and a ‘northern league’ led by the old regionalist guard); ii) the extent to which Berlusconi will be willing to remain in the current right wing coalition with Salvini, or look elsewhere for partners (i.e. the PD).
Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement, M5s)
M5s entered the Italian political scene in 2009 as an anti-establishment force, striking a chord among an electorate weighted down by the economic crisis and disillusioned by the traditional political class. In 2013 the party contested its first general election, achieving a phenomenal success by snatching the largest share of votes (25%). However, following that election the M5s did not get into power: while its support was wide, it was far from being sufficient to allow it to form a majority government. Fearing it would lose support by making an agreement with the PD which it saw as part of the old political ‘caste’, the M5s refused to enter a coalition with it, so that the Democrats ended up governing with Berlusconi’s FI. However, this did not stop the M5s from gaining other important successes, e.g. winning the mayoral elections in Rome and Turin in 2016. And yet, since then, the ‘novelty effect’ on which the movement built much of its electoral success has started to vanish. In addition, the turbulent performance of the M5s in government (both in Rome and Turin) has led some to question its credibility. Furthermore, Beppe Grillo (the ‘owner’ of the M5s symbol) has recently stepped aside, ushering in the unexperienced Luigi Di Maio as the new ‘leader’ and candidate for PM. Thus, the movement is currently confronted with the difficult task of addressing its ideological, strategic and organisational ambiguities. Polls suggest that it could emerge again as the most popular party in the country, by gaining around 28% of the vote. However, given the current electoral law, it is almost impossible that the M5s will be able to govern alone. Again, the future of Grillo’s party hangs on the thread of the actual election results. Only then it will become clear whether the M5s will stick to its ‘golden rule’ of intransigence, by refusing to enter any coalition with other parties, or if Di Maio will usher in a new phase of institutionalisation, opening the way to negotiations with other actors (such as, perhaps, Salvini’s LN, as some commentators have argued).
Where do we go from here?
As we write, we are left with very few certainties about this election – especially considering the opinion polls. Indeed, a good 35% of voters are still undecided and could still swing the result. The first certainty is that, as our discussion highlighted, the Italian political system still struggles to renew itself. Secondly, although the final election results cannot be predicted, electoral polls have hardly changed for several months, so it is clearly very unlikely that any single party will be able to govern alone. Hence, whatever government eventually emerges in the aftermath of the vote, as former foes are forced to govern together, will probably not be stable nor long lasting. This could have major repercussions for the country – with the potential to aggravate, rather than provide an effective solution to – the economic and social crises it is already facing. Of course, if, as many predict, the election will lead to the creation of some ‘grand coalition’ that forces its members to scrap the promises they had made during the campaign to be able to get along for a while with their former opponents, we would probably see the already wide gap between citizens and politics grow even further. Again, this could impact on the political and social stability of the country, and further feed the populist wave that has impacted so greatly on Italy, as well as many other liberal democracies across Europe in recent decades.
** This article was originally posted on the SPERI website
as part of an IPSG blog series on the 2018 general election. Over the
coming week more blogs will be posted which will be available to read here.
