The POLSIS research group (University of Birmingham) and the IPSG have organised a first discussion of the Italian election's results on 6 March 2018. Speakers: Daniele Albertazzi (University of Birmingham), Arianna Giovannini (De Montfort University) and Davide Vampa (Aston University). Listen to the podcast here.
Italy has been a populist stronghold for two and a half decades – that is since 1994, when Silvio Berlusconi
created his Forza Italia (FI) party. His goal was allegedly to “save”
the Italian people from being governed by “Communists” after the
collapse of centrist parties under the weight of anti-corruption
investigations. Having won the election in the same year, Berlusconi
then led a short-lived coalition government, with the support of the
extreme-right party the Social Movement and the regionalist populist
Lega Nord.
Fast forward 24 years to the 2018 election,
and not only is Berlusconi still FI’s leader (and indeed owner), but,
together with a renewed Lega, he has again managed to assemble an
electoral coalition that could end up in government.
However, this time there is an important twist: yet another populist
political actor was born in the meantime and now happens to be the
largest single party of all: the Five Star Movement (M5s).
Having entered the Italian political scene less than ten years ago as
an anti-establishment force, this group has struck a chord with an
electorate weighted down by the economic crisis and fed up with the
corruption of mainstream parties. In this election the party has
attracted just below one third of the votes by standing alone.
Rising stars
A first analysis of the electoral outcome should start with the undisputed winner
– that is M5s. There is no denying it has achieved an amazing result,
especially given that its performance in leading local administrations
in recent years, particularly the city of Rome, has been far from
impressive.
Having gained around 32% of the national vote, M5s has confirmed its
position as the most successful new party in the history of Western
Europe (going from 0 to 25% between 2009 and 2013, and having grown of a
further 7% in the following five years). As such, the Italian
president, Sergio Mattarella, might well feel compelled to give it a
chance to form a government before exploring the alternatives. M5S founder Beppe Grillo with the party’s proposed candidate for prime minister Luigi Di Maio.EPA
However, it is not obvious at this stage who could work with Beppe
Grillo’s party to lead the country. A solution will probably turn out to
be to reach an agreement with the Democratic Party (PD). But that’s the
very party that M5s has long identified as the source of the country’s
ills. This would be a complete reversal of the position taken by M5s
after the 2013 election, when it refused to even consider such a
possibility and went into opposition, forcing the PD to govern with FI.
The difference between then and now, however, is considerable. Back
then, the PD-led coalition had emerged from the election with 29% of the
vote – the largest share. M5s took 25%. Moreover, this coalition had a
much larger number of seats than M5s, due to the electoral law in force
at the time. This time round, the PD suffered a crushing defeat (its
vote has gone down from 25% in 2013 to 18%) and would be forced into a
supporting role if it went in to partnership with the dominant M5S. It’s
unclear why the Democrats would want to swallow such a bitter pill.
While not impossible (after all, the centre-left has a great ability to
shoot itself in the foot), I regard such a solution as very unlikely. It
would be tantamount to committing political suicide.
A right-wing alliance
Meanwhile, the right wing alliance – made up of Berlusconi’s FI,
Matteo Salvini’s Lega and Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, is by far
the largest coalition. However, the Lega has overcome FI for the first
time with an astonishing 17% of the vote (vs FI’s 14%). Feeling good: Matteo Salvini.EPA
This is very significant since the agreement between the two was that
whichever of them came on top would have a right to put forward the
prime minister. If the right eventually manages to gain the support of
enough MPs to create a government, therefore, Salvini would have to lead
it.
Salvini’s radicalism and harsh rhetoric
(particularly on immigration) makes it less likely that anyone would
want to give the right wing coalition this opportunity (and in any case,
it is not clear at this stage where such extra MPs would come from).
But having brought the party from 4% in 2013 to 17% today (the best
result ever achieved by the party, and by far) Salvini’s position within
the Lega is now unassailable.
Who governs?
With the right-wing alliance unlikely to have enough seats to govern
on its own and voters so obviously fed up with mainstream parties, it
now looks at least possible that, despite their differences, the Lega
and M5s may want to explore the possibility of governing together. This
would be very difficult for the Lega, as the party would need to ditch
its well tested alliance with FI, one that has served it well during
many years.
Such a move would be further complicated by the fact that the two
right-wing allies (and their minor ally, Brothers of Italy) have fielded
coalition candidates together, since, under the new electoral law, one
third of the seats are selected from single-member districts (SMDs)
according to a plurality rule. It is true that each of the candidates
came from one of these parties and, ultimately, is loyal to them,
however they have received the support of all right-wing voters. If the
Lega ignored this and agreed to join M5s in government, Berlusconi would
accuse them of betraying the electorate.
In the end, what we are left with while we still wait for the final
results to be confirmed is the certainty that populism continues to
dominate Italian politics. Everything else is a question mark.
by Arianna Giovannini** It is still too early to make a full assessment of the results
from last night’s general election in Italy, but what is clear is that
the country emerges from this election as profoundly divided. There is a clear fault line between the centre-North, which is going to the centre-right coalition and the South,
who voted en mass for the Five Star Movement. What unites these ‘two
Italies’ is a support for anti-establishment forces. Turnout is in
decline (around 73 per cent, against 75 per cent of 2013), but still
quite high compared to other European countries. The Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle – M5S) has emerged, as
many anticipated, as the main single political force – gaining,
according to the projected vote so far, around 31.5 and 32 percent in
both chambers. This is well above expectations, and it is a monumental
result for the Movement, which contested its first general election in
2013 achieving an already phenomenal 25 per cent of votes. Yet M5S is still short of the majority needed to form a government
(40 per cent) according to the new electoral law. The interesting point
to note here is that for the first time the Movement is willing to go
against its golden rule of intransigence against coalitions, and it has
invited other political forces to seek a dialogue with them – although
at their own terms and conditions. This could lead to a ‘coalition game’
that could be dangerous for the M5S. So, what are M5S’s options? They could enter negotiations with Matteo
Salvini’s Lega (14%) or with Matteo Renzi’s Democratic Party (PArtito
Democratic – PD), who achieved 19%. Either way, this could be damaging
the M5S as it would force it to either develop an alliance with
far-right forces such as the Lega (something that many of its supporters
would not welcome) or to enter a pact with ‘the devil’, i.e. the party
that embodies the establishment against which the M5S has fought since
day one, the PD. The centre-right is the coalition with the largest share of vote in
the Senate and in the Chamber of Deputies (estimated at around 36 per
cent). This was predictable – but what many commentators did not foresee
was that the League led by Matteo Salvini would gain more support
(above 18 per cent) than Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (nearly 14 per
cent). This is, again, a momentous result for the League – which went from 4
to 18 percent in 5 years. In its strongholds, such as Veneto in Italy’s
north, the Lega is likely to gain up to 33 per cent – an unprecedented
result. In practical terms, this means that Berlusconi has been defeated and
he won’t be the kingmaker of the next government. It also means that if
the right wing coalition holds, Matteo Salvini would become the most
likely candidate prime minister. What remains to be seen is what
position Salvini will take. He’s faced with two choices: he could either
stick to the right-wing coalition or break away and seek a dialogue
with the M5S. The clear loser of this election is centre-left. The PD led by former
PM Matteo Renzi has been swept away. Renzi has managed to take the
party from boom to bust in a matter of few years, and the PD is emerging
from this election in ashes (estimated at around 19 per cent, and
possibly the fourth political force in both chambers – the lowest result
in the history of the party). Renzi’s day of reckoning seems to be
looming, and if the PD was to enter coalition negotiations with the M5S
it would almost certainly be under a new leader. Overall, no single political force or coalition is currently in a
position to form a government. Thus, the next hours (and possibly days)
will be crucial. If we stick to the maths, there are only two coalitions
that could form a government: M5S and PD or a M5S, Lega and Brothers of
Italy. Neither of these would lead to an easy-to-manage and stable
government, and internal and external turbulences would be most likely
to emerge. The President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella will soon
have to chose who will form the next government – he could go for one of
these two coalition options, or opt for a technocratic, transitional
government of ‘national unity’ with a clear remit (e.g. review the
electoral law). Either way, we are at an important turning point in Italian politics:
traditional parties on both sides of the political spectrum have been
marginalised, and the new, anti-establishment forces are going, one way
or another, to have a key role in the next government. Some commentators
have already presented this as the birth of a ‘Third Republic’
under the banner of populism. Whether this accurate or too far fetched
an argument will become clearer only in the next few days.
** This article was originally published on PSA Blog.
Italy’s new electoral law – used for the first time in this
weekend’s election – could have a wide-ranging impact on the country’s
politics by Dario Quattromani**
By the end of Sunday 4th March Italian voters will discover a lot more about themselves than they have known for years, thanks to their brand new electoral law whose main target is to represent them in the new Parliament, rather than allowing the formation of a parliamentary majority to rule their country. This is the result of an historical process of 25 years of electoral reforms. This process started in 1993 with the majoritarian turn of the so-called ‘Mattarellum’; followed by the less appreciated ‘Porcellum’ in 2005 which was declared partially unconstitutional in 2014 and subsequently substituted by the so called ‘Italicum‘ (only valid for the Chamber of Deputies because it was tied to the (failed) constitutional reform of 2016; then finally, during 2017 the Constitutional Court ruled that this electoral law was partially conflicting with the Italian Constitution, and so in the last few months of the 17th legislature Italian MPs were focused on the production of a new electoral law before the scheduled 2018 general elections. Comparing past and present electoral systems It is important to consider the circumstances under which Italian MPs reformed their national electoral system in 1993. A few months earlier many politicians of parties in government had been found guilty of being financed by private entrepreneurs in order to facilitate their affairs. Considering how this situation connected with the party-system, Italian public opinion called for a change to the electoral law, thus leading the Parliament to establish for the first-time-ever a mixed system characterized by 75% of plurality (first-past-the-post) and 25% of proportional representation to elect MPs in the following 1994, 1996 and 2001 general elections. As a result of this new electoral law, Italians experienced the growth of a bipolar political system, deciding to vote for either electoral coalitions mainly representing the centre-right and the centre-left of the political spectrum. When it became enough clear that the ‘Mattarellum’ was going to let the main opposition win the following 2006 elections, Berlusconi’s majority passed a new electoral law in 2005: the so called ‘Porcellum’, a proportional system with a majority bonus for the first party/coalition (at national level for the lower chamber, at regional level for the Senate) which was used in the 2006, 2008 and 2013 general elections. The main targets of the 17th legislature elected in February 2013 were a set of reforms to move the country on from the post-financial crisis period: although public expenditures and economic growth were at the top of the to-do-list most of the reformist activity was dedicated to the elaboration of a new electoral law, the ‘Italicum’, which was strictly connected with the constitutional reform proposed by the Prime Minister Renzi. Once the Constitutional Referendum did not pass in 2016 a new electoral law needed to be prepared by the Parliament, since the two existing ones derived from sentences of the Constitutional Court on the ‘Porcellum’ (for the Senate) and the ‘Italicum’ (for the Chamber of Deputies). After a first attempt to pass a new law failed in June 2017 a fresh attempt after the summer saw both chambers approve (with 8 votes of confidence) the new ‘Rosatellum’ electoral law.
Main points of the Rosatellum – Effects on candidacies; interplay at the regional level; poll results The new Italian electoral law, so called ‘Rosatellum’ because of the deputy (Ettore Rosato) who presented the draft law, is a mixed system (64% proportional – 36% majoritarian), incorporating the main requirements deriving from the two sentences of the Constitutional Court on the previous electoral laws. This new law abandoned the idea of seeking to assure that a ruling majority could be formed, thus heading towards a representative aim; it harmonized the different electoral laws ruling the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies; and finally, it was the expression of the Italian Parliament. One of the big electoral changes after 1992/1993 was the search for a governing majority, and this move back to proportional representation in the new law has not been appreciated enough nationwide. Harmonizing both chambers’ electoral laws let the critics remind people that at the very beginning of Italian republic the two chambers were designed to have different electors, members and characteristics (although, most of these differences only lasted until 1953). Although it was only approved with 8 votes of confidence by both chambers, allowing its critics to undermine the validity of the procedure, more parliamentarians voted for the Rosatellum than any other Italian electoral law.
The Rosatellum has a range of new features which are worth us considering: Providing the return to the ‘power of coalitions’ (which the ‘Italicum’ abandoned), the Rosatellum has three main national thresholds for parties to participate in the distribution of seats in Parliament: 1) parties under 1% of the national vote do not have any representation; 2) those parties forming a coalition who receive a percentage of votes between 1% and 3% add their results to the coalition, but without receiving seats; 3) coalitions that include at least one party who received more than 3%, have to reach 10% of the ballots in order to receive seats. Candidacies for the national seats (618 for the lower Chamber, 309 for the Senate) are restricted to one per party in the single-member constituencies (116 for the Senate and 232 for the Chamber) and up to five in the multi-member constituencies. It is very interesting to analyze the criteria for the allocation of the seats, since it is straightforward that winners in the plurality do get that seat, but where this were not the case, they could gain election in a constituency where they received a lower number of votes. One more restriction, is that voters are now not able to choose a party list while voting for candidates (gender equality being provided) of other political forces outside of the coalition: this is going to be an interesting point when observing, in the same day, how many votes will be cancelled in the two Italian regions voting with different rules (Lazio and Lombardia), since enduring habits are extremely hard to win. Finally, it is relevant, for the reasons behind it and the effects that this measure will produce, to consider the introduction of an antifraud voting card. Its introduction is a recognition of the practice of selling votes and sends a message to those who relied on this to guarantee their results, yet it will probably slowdown electoral procedures, thus implying possible traffic and queueing at polling stations.
In summary, after all these points, a few questions could arise:
Due to the rules for allocation of the seats, which seats will candidates be elected for? Some solution that have been adopted can be read here;
What will the differences be for voting national and regional? A useful answer would come from some examples of coalition-making at both levels: whereas M5S (Five Star Movement) does not seek to make coalitions anywhere, centre-left and centre-right coalitions are not composed by the same parties (ex-PD members who gave birth to a new left movement – LeU -, are running alone in areas where the Democratic Party is likely to do badly – Parliament and Lombardia -, but they are running together in Lazio where the Democratic Party is set to do well), and this varies because of the level of administration (State/Region) and the geographical position (North-Centre/South);
With the target of the new law to represent Italians rather than assuring a majority to govern Italy for five years, what are the possible scenarios? While numbers during all the electoral campaign have been very stable at a macro level, observable variations could be found inside the coalitions, especially the centre-right, with Berlusconi’s Forza Italia acting as the frontrunner of its coalition, necessary for expressing his candidate for the Premiership, the actual President of the European Parliament Antonio Tajani.
** This article was originally posted on the SPERI website as part of an IPSG blog series on the 2018 general election. Over the coming week more blogs will be posted which will be available to read here.
The politics of fear is once again affecting the Italian elections. After debates about fake news
and the promise of very expensive, and for this reason unachievable,
policies, shaped the first stage of the electoral campaign, the
immigration issue has been at the heart of public discussion over these
last few weeks (even though unemployment ranks as the highest issue of
concern for voters). It’s not the first time: other general elections in the recent past
have been strongly characterised by the insecurity produced by
immigration flows and the actions of the political entrepreneurs of fear:
political actors who try to capitalise on xenophobic feelings to extend
their support. But, in the case of the 2018 campaign, it’s more
difficult to forecast the effects of these issues on the final result.
Opinion polls have already showed some clues about this. But, a clearer
frame will be sketched out by analysing the election outcome and
performing post-electoral surveys. The connection between immigration and security has been quite strong
in the perceptions of Italian public opinion since the mid-nineties. A
significant portion of Italians think that the presence of migrants
poses a threat to public order and people’s safety. This perception is
reinforced by official data which say that the proportion of immigrants –
especially, illegal immigrants – amongst offenders is particularly high
for specific crimes. According to data collected by Demos & Pi at
the beginning of 2018, fear of ‘strangers’ is widespread in Italian
society: 45% of interviewed people see immigrants as a threat to their
security. If we analyse the complete time series, this index has reached
comparable levels only two times before: between 1999 and 2001, and
once again between 2007 and 2008. Both phases coincided with the run-up
to a general election. Both campaigns were won by a centre-right
coalition. This issue has become, once again, a hot issue during the 2018
campaign as well. After reaching its highest peak at the end of 2007 –
when one Italian out of two viewed people coming from other countries
with suspicion – social apprehension about immigration had constantly
declined until 2012. But it has reassumed an upward trend over the last
five years, especially since 2016 (see Figure 1). The outbreak of the
migrant and refugee crisis in 2015 saw the issue assume a central stage
in public debate, especially regarding uncontrolled sea arrivals from
Africa to Italian shores through the Mediterranean.
Figure 1: Percentage of Italians who view migrants as a threat for public order and Italians’ safety Source: Demos&Pi Opinion Polls (1999-2018)
In the summer of 2017, there were clashes in the streets of Rome
between the police and groups of refugees and asylum seekers protesting
for having been removed from a building they had been squatting.
Combined with other episodes of violence of which immigrants were the
protagonists (or victims), and with fears connected with possible
terrorist attacks, this event significantly increased the tensions
around the theme of immigration, and further fuelled xenophobic and even
racist sentiments. In 2018 centre-right parties have once again promptly assumed their
role as entrepreneurs of fear. This holds in particular for Matteo
Salvini’s League, which openly reinforced its anti-immigration stance
during the campaign, saying we need to stop an ‘invasion’ and put
‘Italians first’. Once a regionalist party, the League has been
transformed by its new leader into a national(ist) euro-sceptic party,
which takes the French Front National as a model. Among its voters, 69%
see foreign people as a danger. The figure is equally high for their
other centre-right allies: around 65-66% for both Silvio Berlusconi’s
Forza Italia and Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy. In addition, many far-right movements and parties, outside the
official centre-right, are very active in Italy and have increased their
activism (and public visibility) in the recent phase. The tension
reached its highest peak in early February, only one month before the
general elections, when a young man went on a drive-by shooting
targeting black people in the small and historically rich town of
Macerata, seat of an old university. A few days before, near the same
city, a Nigerian immigrant was accused of having murdered a young girl
whose body was found dismembered in two suitcases. What impresses about
the events is that they happened in central Italy – in the Marche region
– traditionally known as a peaceful and socially integrated area. The
Macerata gunman, who had been candidate for the League in local
elections, was arrested by the police wearing an Italian flag on his
shoulders, making a fascist salute and saying ‘I’ve done what had to be
done’. 11% of Italians, interviewed by Demos & Pi, said the man had
done ‘what many would like to do’. In the centre-right coalition, Silvio Berlusconi is trying to present
himself as a moderate barrier against the many different versions of
Italian populism. But after the Macerata events, the old leader has
called for the expulsion of 600,000 illegal immigrants, describing
immigration as a ‘social time bomb’. This statement can be interpreted
as a defensive move against the internal challenge represented by
Salvini, who claim the League will be the leading centre-right party,
and he will be the next prime minister. The new electoral system has
favoured the re-unification of a strongly divided centre-right and given
Berlusconi the opportunity to ‘enter’ the field again after years in
the background. Those parties have been able to build a coalition, which
led the last polls published before the electoral blackout, at around
35-37%. It might not be enough to avoid a hung parliament scenario, but,
if they are going to win, it will be crucial to check the actual
balance inside the coalition to understand where the new majority would
stand on an ideal moderate-radical political spectrum with regards to
immigration as well as other policy issues. It’s not easy to assess how this social climate will impact on the
results on 4th March and to understand if the security syndrome is going
to play the same role as in 2008. Since then the configuration of the
main political blocs has somewhat changed. In particular, the governing
centre-left seems to have changed – or, at least, redefined – its
traditional pro-immigration outlook, which used to promote solidarity
and integration and was always ready to deny the immigration-criminality
equation. Its Interior Minister, Marco Minniti, has gained popularity
in recent months through his measures to reduce arrivals of African
migrants through the Mediterranean. While the Democratic party leader,
Matteo Renzi, has even tried to ‘steal’ some of Salvini’s slogans,
saying that immigrants should be helped ‘at home’ (i.e. in their
countries). Moreover, Italian politics, since 2013, has assumed a tri-polar
format. And the Italian ‘third pole’, represented by the Five Star
Movement, has always expressed a very ambiguous attitude on the
immigration issue. Some of its leaders have not hesitated to express
hard words on the theme of migration, using arguments and tones very
similar to those used by the right. Even though these positions has
often been ‘balanced’ with opposite views expressed by other Five Star
representatives who stressed the exploitation of Africa territory and
society by multinational companies. In accordance with this ambiguous
stance, its supporters appear to be almost equally divided as regards
its attitudes on the migration issue. During the 2018 campaign, Roberta
Lombardi, the Movement’s candidate for the Regional elections in Lazio,
declared her territory should ‘welcome more tourism, which helps local
economy, and less immigrants, who weigh on the local economy’. ‘It’s not
a question of left and right, but a question of common sense’, she
added. The Italian 2018 general election will help (among other things) to
check whether, in a (supposedly) post-ideological era, the immigration
issue still has definite political colour.
** This article was originally posted on the SPERI website
as part of an IPSG blog series on the 2018 general election. Over the
coming week more blogs will be posted which will be available to read here.
Berlusconi’s reputation as one of Europe’s most remarkable politicians of recent decades remains fully deserved by James Newell**
When he was booted out of office in 2011, Silvio Berlusconi’s political
career appeared to enter a new, and seemingly final, phase. He was
occupied less frequently in setting the political agenda than in
reacting to agendas set by others. He was already elderly and support
for his Forza Italia (FI) dwindled as the “anti-establishment” mantle
was assumed by the Five Star Movement (M5s).
Then, at the end of 2013, he was expelled from the Senate and banned
from holding public office following a conviction for tax fraud. Resigned to the fringes, Berlusconi’s role as the driving force in
Italian politics was, until the end of 2016, assumed by the centre-left
Democratic Party (PD) leader Matteo Renzi, with his constitutional
reform agenda. But since then, his fortunes appear to have revived
somewhat. So, with an election coming, is he about to make a political comeback? On the one hand, support for his party remains well below the levels
seen in the past. Before the pre-election ban on the publication of poll
results kicked in, it stood at 16.1%, which means Berlusconi continues
to have to vie with the 44-year-old Matteo Salvini for
leadership of the centre right. Salvini has succeeded in transforming
the Northern League from a regional-autonomy party into a national
populist force. On the other hand, the rivalry between the two has become less
arduous in recent months as polling results have seen Berlusconi’s
party’s numbers slowly rise and place him, once again, in front of the
League. Whatever the outcome of this election, Berlusconi cannot assume the
role of prime minister because of his conviction. However, there is even
a question mark over that because the law banning him from office
applies to offences he committed before it was introduced in 2012.
Berlusconi has appealed to the European Court of Human Rights arguing
that the ruling contradicts the Italian Constitution, which provides
that “no punishment may be inflicted except by virtue of a law in force
at the time the offence was committed”. He also claims it contravenes a
similar provision in the European Convention on Human Rights.
The elder statesman The prospects of Berlusconi’s centre-right coalition emerging with an
overall majority in this election look slim indeed. Given the electoral system,
which distributes a third of the seats according to a
first-past-the-post system, and given the showing of the M5s as a
significant “third force”, the smart money is on none of the three main
contenders emerging as an outright victor. That said, Berlusconi has had a good campaign. He is clearly aware
that, though he may no longer be at the centre of Italian politics, he
might still act as kingmaker. Attempting to appeal to moderate voters
put off by Salvini’s stridency, he has sought to project the image of a
wise elder statesman who has turned his back on his flamboyant past. He
has made pronouncements designed to reassure Brussels and the
international financial markets. It’s a far cry from the past. In 2002 he lost his foreign minister thanks
to his attempts to capitalise on the initial stirrings of popular
resentment about austerity, immigration and security, and to channel it
in the direction of Brussels. But the transformation should not surprise
– Berlusconi is a salesman, after all; campaigning is the activity at
which he excels. His coalition, as an electioneering entity, works very well. Its
three main components each appeal to different varieties of more-or-less
right-wing sentiment. So if he appeals to moderates, and Salvini to
those with far-right, anti-immigrant views, his third ally, Giorgia Meloni and
her Brothers of Italy, appeals to those for whom being on the right
means a feeling of affinity with the ideals of national pride never
entirely relinquished by the heirs of Mussolini. If the specific profile
of each party potentially drives away voters, then the presence of one
of the other two serves to reassure them and keep them on side. And the barely hidden rivalry of the three putative allies has helped
Berlusconi to keep his options open when it comes to the inter-party
negotiations that will be needed to form a government after the
election. If neither M5s, which is without allies, nor the centre left,
which is hopelessly divided, have realistic prospects of forming the
next government, then the only alternative will be a more-or-less grand
coalition. As things currently stand, the most viable option for that
appears to be one based on an arrangement between Forza Italia and the
Democratic Party. So as he continues to compete for an overall majority, Berlusconi is
aware that in the event of failure, he might abandon his more extreme
partners for an arrangement that would still place him close to the
centre of power. Love him or loath him, then, his reputation as one of
Europe’s most remarkable politicians of recent decades remains fully
deserved.
** This article was originally posted on the SPERI website
as part of an IPSG blog series on the 2018 general election. Over the
coming week more blogs will be posted which will be available to read here.
