Political scientists often refer to populism as a ‘thin ideology’, meaning an ideology characterized by a limited set of core beliefs – in this case, that politics is a struggle between a ‘pure people’ and a ‘corrupt elite’ – that can be adapted to various social and political contexts. From this, two things follow. First, it is not possible to be a populist, and be on the left. This assertion may place me in a minority of one, but so be it. It is true that the core idea of populism is ‘thin’ because it can be filled with different policy proposals depending on the specific circumstances or the goals of the political actors involved. But this does not mean that it can be filled with any proposals, and in particular, it is incompatible with the left’s core commitment to equality (Bobbio, 1994). This is because a commitment to equality implies a commitment to diversity and to internationalism. Populism is intrinsically hostile to diversity, not least because ‘the people’ is, by definition, a singular entity; and it is likewise hostile to internationalism because the notion of ‘a people’ implies a political community, and such communities, with their distinctions between members and those excluded from membership, are organised by nation states. Second, the adaptability of populism, and its ability to resonate across different cultural and political landscapes, draws attention to the fact that the populism of political leaders of the late twentieth/early twenty-first century is hardly original, but draws heavily on traditions handed down from the past. Nowhere is this truer than in the case of Silvio Berlusconi.
Berlusconi was the leader of a personal party, Forza Italia, and the pioneer of a new style of personalised political campaigning at which he was particularly adept. Personalisation and populism almost invariably go together because if ‘the people’ implies a single, undifferentiated entity, then the populist leader too is ‘of the people’ and as leader s/he is by definition its most authoritative representative. Berlusconi was masterful in establishing his credentials as most authentic ‘man of the people’. In 1994, while his left-wing opponents
asked him to defend his economic programme against charges that it would damage ordinary workers, he asked them how many Intercontinental Cups they had won – so inverting the class connotations of the exchange by making his opponents seem like arid university professors, he, the billionaire, like a winner whom the average worker and football supporter could understand and admire (Newell, 2019: 64; Stille, 2010: 190-1).
However, personalisation was a style of campaigning that Berlusconi had learned from his mentor, Bettino Craxi, and which Craxi in his turn had learned – ultimately – from Benito Mussolini, with whom newspaper cartoonists often compared him. For Mussolini had understood better than his contemporaries the potential of personalisation for the manipulation and control of large populations in the era of the mass franchise and the mass society that was being ushered in in the initial decades of the twentieth century.
Il caimano is a 2006 film by Nanni Morretti focussing on the vicissitudes of Berlusconi. The caiman, a type of crocodilian, is known for its cunning and agility in hunting, and so not surprisingly, the term is also used figuratively, to refer someone who uses sly and underhand means to manipulate situations to their own advantage: to someone who is without principles, an opportunist. Opportunism is a second feature that almost invariably goes together with populism since populist leaders seek, not to lead the people by reference to their own convictions, but – precisely in order to maintain credibility as the people’s most authentic voice – to dominate the people by focussing exclusively on whatever needs to be done to achieve that end. The term seemed appropriate in Berlusconi’s case. One of his most striking personal characteristics according to the journalist Alexander Stille (2010: 25) was his ‘ability to convey an idea of total conviction and sincerity even when saying things that seem[ed] to be totally unrelated to objective reality’. Famously, he promised a ‘liberal revolution’ in Italian politics and society – but then stood in the front line of defence of taxi drivers and other vested interests against the liberalising reforms of the Prodi government from 2006. His party had no image separate from that of Berlusconi himself, certainly none that could be described by reference to any political principles, and he had joined the political fray in the first place exclusively to safeguard his business interests. Again, his behaviour reflected long-standing traditions. The portmanteau, ‘qualunquismo’, meaning an indifference to political principles, had been bequeathed to the Italian language by the populist, Gugliellmo Giannini. He in his turn had learned from the inventor of Italian populism, Benito Mussolini, who once said:
Programmes are waste paper. We should leave them to the socialists, and their interminable theoretical discussions. I’ve no idea what to do with principles and programmes; indeed, I need to get shot of them, because I need to be able to immerse myself in the moods of the people (quoted by Scurati, 2023: 70).
Finally, Berlusconi was famous for his impatience with the checks and balances of constitutional government, most notably, the idea that he as Prime Minister might be called to respond, by the judiciary, to allegations of illegality in his business dealings. Yet again, such an attitude almost invariably goes together with populism since anything that obstructs the will of the people and therefore its authentic leader originates outside the people and is thus the enemy of the people. Berlusconi’s conviction that elections served the plebiscitarian purpose of the investiture of leaders with the power to issue orders, were reflected in his 2006 constitutional reform project with its ‘anti-ribaltone’ provisions preventing changes of governing majority during the course of a single legislature. His impatience with parliamentary government reflected the view of Mussolini for whom Parliament was a gloomy building populated by the ‘mummies of Montecitorio’ (quoted by Scurati, 2023: 64).
To conclude, populism is inimical to democracy because it rejects principles of pluralism. The inventor of Italian populism, Benito Mussolini, was also a fascist. Berlusconi was a populist but no fascist because he did not use physical violence against his political adversaries – though he did deploy incivility, a form of verbal violence that is harmful to democracy because by definition it implies that those against whom it is used are unworthy of being considered members of the democratic community. Political incivility has the distinctive feature of being something that citizens are repelled by, but at one and the same time feel drawn to – like celebrities: people known for the their well-knownness (Boorstin, 1962: 57) and with whom their fans identify and desire contact. This, then, was the most significant legacy of Berlusconi the populist leader: As a celebrity he taught the populist politicians who came after him – politicians such as Donald Trump and Boris Johnson—that if you can become a celebrity politician then you can create a public following with the potential to make you very powerful indeed – because then you can establish a fan base, and with it a much more powerful link with followers than one that can be provided by mere supporters.
References
Bobbio, Norberto (1994), Destra e Sinistra: Ragioni e significati di una distinzione politica, Roma: Donzelli editore
Boorstin, Daniel J. (1962), The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America, New York and Boston: Harper Colophon Books.
Newell, James L. (2019), Silvio Berlusconi: A Study in Failure, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Scurati, Antonio (2023), Fascismo e populismo: Mussolini oggi, Florence and Milan: Giunti Editore/Bompiani
Stille, Alexander (2010), Citizen Berlusconi: Il Cavalier Miracolo, Milan: Garzanti.
