Ahead of Sunday's Referendum on Constitutional Reform, James L. Newell (IPSG Chair and Professor of Politics at the University of Salford) reflects on the crucial points of the reform, and future scenarios:
The Italian Referendum: What should we expect after Sunday?
James L. Newell
This coming Sunday, Italians go to the polls in a
constitutional referendum. This has been widely dubbed as offering the stage
for a third ‘popular revolt’ against the establishment following Brexit and the
election of Donald Trump. Matteo Salvini, the leader of the right-wing populist
Northern League, on receiving the news of Trump’s election was heard to
exclaim: “Now its our turn!”
And the potential consequences of the referendum have often
been painted in lurid colours with suggestions that it could bring the populist
Five-star Movement (M5S) to power. The party has demanded a referendum on
Italy’s membership of the euro. This could herald the break-up of the EU, it is
said. On the left, it is pointed out that the proposed changes to the
Constitution are massive. These, it is said, could lead to a reduction of
political accountability and checks and balances that put in doubt Italy’s very
status as a constitutional democracy.
The reality is much more prosaic and here’s why.
For one thing, the referendum won’t be a third revolt
against ‘the establishment’ for the simple reason that it is very difficult to
know who ‘the establishment’ is in this case. On the one hand, the reforms are
being championed by Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s Democratic Party (PD) and the
moderate parties of the centre. On the other hand, they are being opposed by
the parties of the centre right including Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia.
Lined up against the reforms are also a minority in the PD, the parties of the
left and the populist M5S under former comedian Beppo Grillo. So is ‘the
establishment’ Renzi, who is pushing for the reforms as part of the promise,
which brought him to power, to do away with vested interests? Or is it the
populist Berlusconi and his even-more-populist bed-fellow, Grillo, who are
defending the constitutional status quo?
So support for, and opposition to the reforms cross-cut the
usual political divides. They also cross-cut the usual social divides. The
proportions lined up on either side, do not differ much whether we are talking
about the so-called ‘liberal elite’ of the well-educated in high-status
occupations – or those in more modest circumstances.
And what of the reforms themselves? The two most
high-profile proposals are, first, a change to the constitutional status of the
Senate. This is to be stripped of its equal law-making powers with the Chamber
of Deputies and turned into a revising chamber. And it is to be indirectly
elected from among regional councillors and mayors. This, it is said, will
improve the speed and efficiency of policy making by putting a stop to the
endless ‘ping-pong’ of bills between Chamber and Senate until they can agree on
identically worded texts.
The truth is that the speed of law-making in Italy compares
favourably with other countries. Problems only arise when the two bodies have
different political majorities as happened due to the electoral law that was in
force between 2005 and 2014.
And the reforms may bring no improvement because they
replace the existing, identical powers, with a range of legislative procedures
depending on the type of bill. Combine that with the differences in the ways
members of the Chamber and the Senate are to be selected and you get the
following. The two bodies may express different political majorities much of
the time. So lack of clarity about what legislative procedure is to be used,
when, may encourage Senators to use this as a form of filibustering and lead to
much time-wasting litigation before the Constitutional Court.
Second, linked to the reforms is a change in the electoral
law, which will give a majority bonus of 55% of the seats in the Chamber to the
list that receives at least 40% of the votes. If no list achieves this, there
will be a run-off ballot between the two most voted lists. The winner at this
round will get the majority bonus; the remaining seats will be distributed
among the losers. This, it is said, will increase the likelihood that a single
party ends up with an overall majority. Thereby it will increase the power of
the executive together with government stability. But there is nothing to stop
parties fielding candidates as part of a single list with others – and then
reclaiming their autonomy, in Parliament, after the election. Such has
happened at every election in recent years. Parties know that they can unite
with potential allies at election time and then go their separate ways afterwards
simply by blackmailing them: “I might not be able to win, but by running
independently, I can make sure you lose!”
In any case, executive stability and the efficiency of
law-making are not the main problems. Italy’s problems lie not at the point at
which legislation is made but at the points where it is implemented – in
inefficiencies in the public administration and the judicial system, and in
adequacies in adherence to rule-of-law principles.
What, then, of the likely outcome? There is little doubt
that it will be close and in that respect comparisons with Brexit and Trump are
appropriate. Polls put the No side ahead by about 5% – but many are undecided
and the polls do not take account of the choices of Italians resident abroad of
which there are about four million: a sizeable chunk of the electorate.
If Renzi wins, then his authority will go up and he might be
tempted to capitalise on that through early elections.
But early elections will not be possible before legislation
has been put in place to give effect to the way members of the new Senate are
to be selected. And there will probably have to be further discussion of the
electoral law for the Chamber as well. In September he was forced to agree to a
parliamentary motion declaring a willingness to revisit it and it has been
challenged before the Constitutional Court.
So the electoral law may not survive in its current form,
and even if it does, the outcome of an election in 2017 and 2018 will probably
be far less dramatic than is assumed. On current poll ratings, likely winners
are the PD or the M5S. The significance one attributes to this depends on how
cohesive one judges them to be and this will depend on future political
developments. It is an open question whether an M5S that draws support from
across the political spectrum and has hitherto been a party of protest, would
be able to remain cohesive in face of the pressures of governing. Its
experience of governing at the local level suggests doubt is in order. 17% of
those the M5S elected to Parliament in 2013 have already defected.
If Renzi loses, then having staked his future on the
referendum outcome, he will probably resign. This will probably lead to the
appointment of a technocratic government with the specific remit of securing
parliamentary approval for a new electoral law, before the holding of fresh
elections. I base this prediction on the thought that the legislature has only
about fourteen months left to run; that for the parties such a government would
represent a positive-sum outcome (none would win at the expense of others);
that putting such a government in place would have the advantage of speed:
assuming that a resignation on the part of Renzi sends shockwaves around Europe
and the markets, President Sergio Matarella will want to resolve the crisis
quickly.
So the day after the referendum result is announced, do not
wake up expecting to find the world turned upside down. Whichever way it goes,
it will be followed by a period of uncertainty. Here again comparisons with
Brexit are appropriate. In the world of politics things are simply much more
complex than journalists and politicians too often like to make out.
